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ABSTRACT
Research on cyber-behavioral biometric authentication has traditionally as
sumed naive (or zero-effort) impostors who make no attem pt to generate sophisticat
ed forgeries of biometric samples. Given the plethora of adversarial technologies on
the Internet, it is questionable as to whether the zero-effort threat model provides a
realistic estimate of how these authentication systems would perform in the wake of
adversity. To better evaluate the efficiency of these authentication systems, there is
need for research on algorithmic attacks which simulate the state-of-the-art threats.
To tackle this problem, we took the case of keystroke and touch-based authenti
cation and developed a new family of algorithmic attacks which leverage the intrinsic
instability and variability exhibited by users’ behavioral biometric patterns. For both
fixed-text (or password-based) keystroke and continuous touch-based authentication,
we: 1) Used a wide range of pattern analysis and statistical techniques to examine
large repositories of biometrics data for weaknesses th at could be exploited by ad
versaries to break these systems, 2) Designed algorithmic attacks whose mechanisms
hinge around the discovered weaknesses, and 3) Rigorously analyzed the impact of
the attacks on the best verification algorithms in the respective research domains.
When launched against three high performance password-based keystroke ver
ification systems, our attacks increased the mean Equal Error Rates (EERs) of the
systems by between 28.6% and 84.4% relative to the traditional zero-effort attack.

For the touch-based authentication system, the attacks performed even better, as
they increased the system’s mean EER by between 338.8% and 1535.6% depending
on parameters such as the failure-to-enroll threshold and the type of touch gesture
subjected to attack. For both keystroke and touch-based authentication, we found
th at there was a small proportion of users who saw considerably greater performance
degradation than others as a result of the attack. There was also a sub-set of users
who were completely immune to the attacks.
Our work exposes a previously unexplored weakness of keystroke and touchbased authentication and opens the door to the design of behavioral biometric systems
which are resistant to statistical attacks.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Overview
Biometrics — a set of measurements of either the human characteristics ac
quired naturally over time (behavioral biometrics), or the inherent physical traits of
an individual (physiological biometrics) — have recently seen a lot of applications
in user authentication [1, 2] and cryptographic key generation [3, 4]. The increased
interest in biometrics has stemmed from a number of factors, key among which being
the generally high entropy across a user population, and the elimination of the need
for a subject to memorize a potentially complex secret.
While physiological biometrics (e.g., fingerprints, iris patterns) are stable and
highly unique for each user, behavioral biometrics (e.g., keystroke dynamics, handwrit
ing, touch gestures) tend to be imprecise, in some cases exhibiting considerable intra
user variability and overlap across users. This imprecision and variability prompts
questions as to whether well orchestrated statistical attacks would not severely de
grade the performance of authentication systems based on these modalities. Unfortu
nately, the majority of research in this field seems to disregard this threat, with most
systems being evaluated under the assumption of a naive attacker who is unable to
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pull off a sophisticated forgery. As a result, very little is known about the resistance
of these systems to sophisticated forgeries.
In this work, we applied a wide range of pattern analysis techniques to discover
attack vulnerabilities in keystroke and touch biometrics data, and then developed
a new family of algorithmic attacks th at exploit the discovered weaknesses to de
grade the performance of the two categories of authentication systems. Keystroke
authentication — the use of keyboard typing traits to identify/authenticate users
— is categorized into two branches, namely, fixed-text authentication [5, 6, 7] and
continuous authentication [8, 9]. Both types of authentication classify users based
on the way in which they type the different characters making up a string, the only
difference being th at fixed-text authentication is based on short memorized strings
(typically passwords), while continuous authentication is based on large chunks of
text th at users type while they freely interact with the computer. The keystroke
attacks designed in this work are targeted against fixed-text keystroke authentication
systems.
Touch-based authentication is a form of authentication in which touch patterns
(such as swiping, zooming and clicking/tapping on a touch screen) are used to iden
tify/authenticate users. Like keystroke authentication, touch-based authentication
is also categorized into two branches: “entry point” authentication and continuous
authentication.

In continuous authentication users’ touch gestures are monitored

throughout a phone usage session [10, 11, 12]. In “entry point” authentication on the
other hand, users are authenticated based on how they execute a certain (possibly
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secret) gesture at the entry point to an application or to the phone itself (i.e., login)
[13, 14, 15]. This work focuses on continuous touch-based authentication.
For both keystroke and touch-based authentication, we first perform a statis
tical evaluation of biometric data collected from a large population of users, before
using the observed statistical traits to design and launch statistical attacks on users’
templates. In practice the keystroke statistical attack designed in this work would
be launched with the aid of bots— a class of rogue applications th a t are now well
understood to have the capacity to emulate keystrokes [16], based on programs like
xsendkeycode [17] for the X Window system and APIs such as Sendlnput [18] for
Microsoft Windows.

Given a bot designed to mimic human typing, a motivated

attacker who has access to a sizeable amount of users’ typing data could extract
representative model information from one population, and use it as input to the bot
so as to attack users’ keystroke profiles from any other population.
Since the dynamics of how a bot could generate and submit fake keystrokes
at a verifier have been explored in recent literature [16], we do not implement a live
bot in this study. Instead we evaluate a feature-level attack under the assumption
of a password-keystroke co-authentication system for which the attacker has accessed
the victim’s password, possesses the required software tools, and is only left with the
task of synthetically generating the keystroke sequence corresponding to the user’s
profile. Our assumption of a stolen password is not uncommon in security evaluations
of biometrics systems “as it allows evaluators to better understand how much extra
security the biometric adds to the strength of the password [19]”. In fact, we argue
th at on the basis of the current prevalence of attacks launched to steal authentication

d ata from central storage servers1, it is not unlikely th at a password-keystroke system
could be faced with adversaries who already have knowledge of the victim ’s password.
To launch our statistical attack on a touch-based authentication system in
practice, we used a robot to execute the statistically fine-tuned touch gestures on the
screen. While there exist a wide range of robots th at could be used for this purpose,
we assume th at it would be infeasible for the adversary to use a very expensive and
sophisticated robot (that could cost thousands of dollars) for the sake of breaking the
security of a stolen touch screen device (e.g., phone). For this reason, we implemented
our statistical attack using the standard Lego Mindstorms NXT robotic kit [21], a
very cheap robot th at can easily be programmed to perform swiping and clicking
operations2. The simplicity of this robot convinces us th at our attack could easily
get embraced by adversaries if continuous touch-based authentication became widely
deployed. Additionally, the fact th at the attack is launched in the analog domain
implies th at it cannot easily be stopped by conventional software solutions like would
be the case for malware-based attacks.

1.2 D issertation Contributions
In this dissertation we analyze two large behavioral biometrics data reposito
ries — one of which a keystroke dataset and the other a touch gestures dataset — for
vulnerabilities th a t can be exploited by adversaries to attack the associated authen
tication systems. We then design a family of attacks th at leverage these weaknesses
1One recent example of a large-scale attack is described in [20]
2Research on continuous touch-based authentication primarily revolves around three frequently
occurring gestures — clicking (or tapping), swiping to move the screen vertically, and swiping to
move the screen horizontally [10, 11])
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to break keystroke and touch-based authentication systems. Our contributions are
described in greater detail below.
1. We design an algorithmic attack mechanism th at exploits the instability of
users’ keystroke features to degrade the performance of a keystroke biometric
system. Relative to the zero-effort attacks typically used to test the performance
of keystroke biometric systems, we show th a t our algorithmic attack increases
the Equal Error Rates (EERs) of three high performance keystroke verifiers
by between 28.6% and 84.4%. Our results confirm th at zero-effort impostor
testing can underestimate the threat faced by a keystroke verifier in practice,
and demonstrate the need for the incorporation of algorithmic attacks in the
standard impostor testing routine of keystroke verifiers.
2. We introduce the notion of robotic attacks against touch-based authentication.
While we use a Lego robot to emphasize th at these attacks could be implemented
at minimal cost, our core contribution is not with regard to a particular robot
type or algorithm (one could use a more sophisticated robot to launch a high
precision attack).

Rather, its the illustration th a t robots (in general) are

a much more realistic performance evaluation tool (than the currently used
methods) for the fast emerging field of touch-based authentication. Relative to
the traditional zero-effort attack, our robotic attack increased the mean EERs
of the verification algorithms by between 338.8% and 1535.6% depending on the
failure to enroll threshold and the type of stroke used for classification. Further,
we found th a t the impact of the attack could not be significantly reduced by a
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failure to enroll policy which bars the “poor” performing users from enrolling
onto the system.
3. P utting aside the performance of the attacks, our work, by virtue of being the
first to analyze the statistical attributes of a large keystroke dataset assembled
over several years, could serve as a reference benchmark for studies th a t continue
to be built around small numbers of users. This problem of keystroke research
being predominantly based on small datasets has prompted questions on how the
results reported from these experiments generalize to large keystroke systems in
practice [22], and has, among other issues always called for a large-scale study
whose findings can give some insights into the properties of keystroke data
at scale.

Our observations on the Gaussianity, discriminability and mutual

information of keystroke features should address this gap for a number of
research areas within keystroke.
4. Although the small size of our touch biometrics dataset (relative to the keystroke
dataset) limits the rigor of our analysis, we present some statistics expressing
variables such as: the regions of the screen on which most swiping is done, the
pressure exerted on the screen, and the area of the finger touching the screen.
These empirical results should play a role in enabling the community to better
understand the dynamics of users’ touch behavior.

1.3 Definitions and Terminology
In this section we define the various terminologies th a t are central to the
methodology used in this dissertation. Some of these terms are further described
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when they axe first used in the dissertation.
F alse R e je c t R a te (F R R ): The proportion of genuine authentication attem pts th at
the authentication system classifies as impostor attem pts. Elsewhere in literature, this
term is also referred to as the False Alarm Rate.
F alse A c c e p t R a te (FA R ): The proportion of impostor authentication attem pts
th at the authentication system classifies as genuine attem pts. Elsewhere in literature,
this term is also referred to as the Impostor Pass Rate.
E q u a l E r r o r R a te (E E R ): The error rate at which the FAR and FRR are equal.
D e te c tio n -E rro r (D E T ) T rad eo ff C urve: The plot of FAR versus FRR or vice
versa. The EER can be computed with the aid of this curve.
C lassifier (o r V erifier): A program which assigns a new observation to a given
class based on training carried out on observations whose class membership is known.
B io m e tric te m p la te : A stored record of a user’s biometric features. During testing
(or authentication), a new biometric sample provided by the user is compared with
the stored tem plate (using a classifier) so as to determine whether the new sample
indeed belongs to the user in question.
N u ll h y p o th e sis (Ha): A claim th at is to be subjected to a statistical test. The
alternative hypothesis is the hypothesis contrary to the null hypothesis. Rejection of
the null hypothesis implies acceptance of the alternative hypothesis.
L evel o f significance, o r c ritic a l value, a: The probability th at the null hypoth
esis is rejected when it is in fact true. It is also referred to as the Type I error.
P value: The probability of obtaining a test statistic th at is at least as extreme as
the one th a t was actually observed, given th at the null hypothesis is true
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A to u c h s tro k e (o r sw ipe): The path taken by the finger on the touch screen. These
two are not standard terms, and could hence assume completely different meanings
in other literature.
C y b e r-b e h a v io ra l b io m etrics: A class of biometric modalities in which users are
identified based on how they interact with computing devices (e.g., desktop computers,
phones, etc.). Examples of cyber-behavioral biometric modalities include: keystroke
dynamics, touch behavior, web usage patterns, etc.
Z ero -effo rt a tta c k : A method of testing the performance of a biometric authentica
tion system th at uses samples generated by one user (i.e., the user designated as the
impostor) to attack the template built for another user (i.e., the user designated as
the genuine user, or victim). This attack method simulates a scenario in which the
attacker does not make any attem pt to imitate the victim’s biometric footprint.

1.4 O rg a n iz a tio n o f th e D is s e rta tio n
In Chapter 2, we discuss the various past works which relate to the statistical
analysis and attacks designed in this paper. In Chapters 3, 4 and 5, we respectively
discuss our d ata collection and feature extraction, statistical analysis and the attack
on the keystroke system. In Chapter 6 we discuss our data collection and feature
extraction, statistical analysis and the attack on the touch-based authentication
system. Finally in chapter 7, we give our conclusions and some indications of future
work.

CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
2.1 R elated Work and M otivation Behind Touch-based A uthentication
Over the past few years, the popularity and usage of mobile devices (i.e., smart
phones, tablets, etc.,) has grown exponentially [23]. One of the key factors for the
proliferation of these devices—their portability relative to the desktop computer—
also unfortunately manifests as a major weakness from the point of view of physical
security. The ease with which these devices can be carried around in their owners’
pockets and (or) briefcases is the same ease with which they can be misplaced or
stolen by adversaries.

Once in the hands of a sophisticated attacker, both the

remotely accessible resources and stored data on these devices (eg., passwords, social
security numbers, bank details, private emails, company secrets, etc.,) could easily be
compromised, potentially resulting into catastrophic consequences for businesses and
(or) individuals.
Currently, the most widely employed defense against such threats is the PIN
lock mechanism. However, this mechanism is incorrectly used by some users (eg., by
setting very long timeouts [10]), completely disengaged by others [24], and susceptible
to several attacks even when users engage it in accordance with the best practices
[25, 26]. To augment the single line of defence offered by the PIN lock, researchers
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have recently studied the possibility of continuously authenticating users after the
initial login phase is completed [27].
Among the continuous authentication approaches th at have been explored,
touch-based authentication has attracted a lot of attention given th a t it revolves
around touch gestures th a t users execute during their routine operations on the phone
[10, 11, 12]. Touch gestures arise naturally from operations such as scrolling, zooming
and clicking, and can thus be used by an authentication application without requiring
the user to pay attention to the authentication process.
In a recent Active Authentication (AA) research drive championed by the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) [28], touch gestures have been
identified as one of the candidate biometric modalities th at could be built into a pilot
multi-modal “biometric platform [28]” to be deployed in IT devices at the Department
of Defense (DoD). W ith the American government actively joining the stake-holders
interested in evaluating the potential of touch-based authentication, there is now little
doubt th at interest in this area of research is only bound to increase.
As already mentioned in Chapter 1, research on touch-based authentication is
categorized into two groups: 1) authentication mechanisms in which touch gestures
are used for authentication at an entry point (e.g., at login), and, 2) authentication
mechanisms in which touch gestures are extracted continuously as the user performs
various tasks on the phone. The former category includes studies in which users touch
behavior is analyzed based on a set of canonically defined gestures [13, 14] or gestures
strictly captured at the unlock screen [15].
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“Entry point” touch-based authentication has several operational dissimilari
ties with continuous touch-based authentication. Perhaps the most notable of these is
the fact th a t the known geometry of the hand can be easily matched with the strictly
defined structure of a gesture to ensure th at only touch points associated with similar
fingers (say, a thum b in the tem plate and a thumb presented during testing) are
compared during “entry point” authentication [13]. Such kinds of assumptions can not
be made with continuous authentication where users freely interact with the phones,
touching them with whatever fingers and in whatever way they find comfortable.
Because the attacks designed in this work are targeted against continuous touchbased authentication systems, we delve deeper into past works which studied this
type of authentication.
Using a dataset of 41 users, Prank et al. [10] obtained Equal Error Rates
(EERs) of between 0 and 4% when a k-Nearest Neighbors (k-NN) classifier and a
Support Vector Machine (SVM) were used to continuously authenticate users based
on their touch gestures. The study was based on 30 features extracted while users
swiped/scrolled (to move the screen vertically or horizontally) as they read text
and browsed images.

In [12], a digital sensor glove was shown to enhance the

performance of a touch gesture-based continuous authentication system.

Using a

decision tree, Random Forest and Bayes Net classifier, the authors showed th at the
glove reduced the error rates seen during authentication. For instance, for the Bayes
Net classifier, a False Accept Rate (FAR) of 11.96% and a False Reject Rate (FRR)
of 8.53% respectively reduced to 2.14% and 1.63% when the glove was used. Similar
improvements were noted for the two other classifiers.
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More recently, Li et al. [11] evaluated the performance of a live implementation
of a touch-based authentication system on a mobile phone. Leveraging a “hack into
the lower layer of an Android system [11]”, the system monitored touch gestures
across all applications installed on the phone. Based on a group of 75 users who were
allowed to freely interact with the phones for days, the SVM-based authentication
system was shown to attain classification accuracies as high as 95%.
All three papers cited above employ a zero-effort testing routine in which the
system’s resistance to attack is gauged based on simplistic attacks in which samples
from a subset of the population are used to attack samples drawn from a given user.
It is on this front th a t this work advances the state-of-the-art, studying the impact
th a t sophisticated adversaries could have on this type of authentication.

2.2 Related Work and M otivation Behind Keystroke A uthentication
Unlike touch-based authentication which traces its roots to just a few years
ago (following the emergence of touch screen devices), keystroke dynamics dates back
several decades ago [29, 30]. Right from the earliest works on keystroke dynamics, the
categorization between fixed-text and continuous keystroke dynamics was apparent:
Forsen et aVs work in 1977 [29] was based on a small group of users who typed
each other’s names (i.e., fixed-text) while Gaines et aV s analysis in 1980 [30] was
based on pages of text typed by the users (i.e., continuous or free text).

Over

the past few decades, both streams of keystroke dynamics have seen a tremendous
amount of research (see detailed keystroke dynamics history in [31]), with fixed-text
authentication being evaluated for its potential to add a second layer of defense to the
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password at login-time [2, 32, 5, 6]), and continuous authentication being evaluated
as a means to repeatedly authenticate a user after the initial login is completed
[8, 33, 34, 35].
W ith the vast majority of research on this topic assuming a zero-effort threat
model, there are only a handful papers which directly relate to the algorithmic attack
problem addressed in this work. Investigating synthetic attacks against keystroke
systems, Khandakher et al. [36] present an attack called a Snoop-Forge-Replay attack
in which an adversary snoops on a victim’s typing session using a keylogger, uses the
captured d ata to build a fake template for the user (with the aid of outlier filtering
in some cases), and then replays the data to defeat the verification mechanism. The
attack was shown to induce increments in EER (relative to the zero-effort baseline)
of between 69.33 % and 2730.55 % depending on parameters such as the amount of
text snooped, the outlier filtering policy and the classifier used for authentication.
The attacks in [37] and [7] build on the same idea used in [36] as they both use
a keylogger to steal a user’s typing latencies before using the stolen data as a source
of input for an attack against the same user. The attack in [37] uses the captured
latencies to train human impostors who later attack the victim’s keystroke profile,
while the attack in [7] uses these latencies as a basis for systematically morphing
the victim’s tem plate into a weaker tem plate th at can easily succumb to attack. The
major difference between these works and our research is th at our generative algorithm
uses general information on how a typical user would type a given string, and does not
depend on text snooped from the victim. It is thus not surprising th a t the attacks in
[36], [37] and [7] attain much higher success rates than our attack (i.e., relative to the
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zero-effort attack, the increments in EER were as high as 2730.55%, 395% and 305%
in [36], [37] and [7] respectively compared to a maximum increment of 84.4% in our
work). T hat said, our belief is th a t the relative ease of accessing general population
keystroke statistics as compared to the intricacies of snooping on the typing session
of an intended victim should make our model of attack more appealing to attackers
in practice.
In [16], it was shown th a t an authentication system (called TUBA [16]) using
a Support Vector Machine (SVM) for keystroke verification was able to repel a form
of statistical attack. Unfortunately, the authors did not publish the parameters used
to set up the SVM verifier, as they stated th at “our timing approach was more along
the lines of brute-force, and we thus do not show the final chosen parameters [16]” .
We do not run our attack against the verifier used in [16], since it is very difficult to
make a meaningful comparison without a set of common param eter settings. However,
we evaluate our attack against three state-of-the-art keystroke verification algorithms
(details in Section 5.4) th a t have been demonstrated to be among the best for fixed
text authentication, do not require sophisticated tuning of parameters, and whose
implementation details we have clearly laid out for other researchers who may seek
to evaluate their statistical attacks against the same set of verifiers.
Below, we discuss four major aspects th at put our algorithmic attack apart
from th a t implemented in [16]:
1. Feature Distribution Assumptions—The attack in [16] is built under the assump
tion th a t keystroke features follow a Gaussian distribution. However, as we show
in this work (Section 4), this assumption is suspect since we find none of the
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115 features extracted from our samples to be Gaussian. W ith Stefan et al. [16]
not having tested their samples for Gaussianity, it is difficult to tell whether
their conclusion about keystroke dynamics being resilient to synthetic forgeries
could have been impacted by the Gaussianity assumption. Our attack does not
make any assumptions about the keystroke feature distributions.
2. Size of User-population and Duration of Data Collection—Stefan et al. [16] esti
mated the parameters of their assumed Gaussian distribution, and implemented
their attack based on data collected from a small group of 20 users. Even if
the keystroke features had indeed been Gaussian, parameter estimates from a
dataset of 20 users are unlikely to accurately represent the underlying distri
bution. Also, as we show in Section 5.5, the dip in m ean system performance

seen under our statistical attacks primarily originated from a small proportion
of about 10% to 20 % of the full population who badly succumbed to the attack.
W ith a small set of 20 users, the likelihood of capturing the full variety of typing
traits naturally diminishes, and it is thus not so surprising th a t the work in [16]
appears to have failed to reflect the impact of the “poor” users who negatively
impacted the overall system performance in our experiments. The fact th at
the dataset in [16] was collected over a short period of time also made it hard
to get a realistic view of the attack performance, since the inconsistency and
long-term evolution of users’ features th at a statistical attack would typically
be expected to exploit was obviously not reflected in the users’ keystroke data
samples.
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3. Attack Design—The attack in [16] did not use any additional keystroke-feature
properties (besides the assumed Gaussian behavior of keystroke features) to
aid the feature space enumeration process. Our attack exploits the feature
distributions, discriminability and dependencies between keystroke features to
traverse the search space as intelligently as possible. We believe th at the usage
of a wider range of keystroke feature properties during attack design should
make our statistical attack more rigorous than th at implemented by Stefan et
al. [16].
4. Keystroke Features Used— The attack in [16] was based on a relatively new
feature-set1, which despite extending our understanding of the different features
th at a keystroke system could use, left behind the question: How would the
traditional keystroke features (described in Section 4) on which most proposed
keystroke systems have been based, perform against synthetic forgeries ? Our
work addresses this question by subjecting these (traditional) features to the
attacks.

The works in [38, 39], despite being based on handwriting biometrics evaluate
the performance of a wide range of synthetic attacks in an environment similar to
ours. In particular, the generative attack whose input is either extracted from general
population handwriting statistics or from text written by the victim in a context
different from th a t of the exact word (or phrase) subject to attack, closely relates
to our work by virtue of using an autom ated algorithmic approach against short
1Prom a 14-character string, they extract a 121 dimensional feature vector which they later reduce
through Principal Component Analysis
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strings of text comparable to the password-like strings used in this paper. For certain
categories of users, this attack was shown to considerably outperform attacks launched
by trained human forgers in a verification mechanism which included both human
judges and an autom ated reference monitor.
These findings motivate the work in this paper, although it is noteworthy th at
the operational dissimilarities between keystroke dynamics and handwriting mean
th a t our algorithmic framework can not directly derive from the approach in [38].
Another difference between ours and Ballard et aV s [38] work, is th at we do not
extract any input from strings typed by the intended victim, since we focus on an
attacker who only uses global typing traits to launch local attacks against individuals.
W ith regard to the keystroke statistical traits th at we investigate to guide the
design of our attack algorithm, Janakiraman et al. [40] also studied the discriminability of keystroke feature vectors as we do in this paper. However, th a t work was not
based on fixed text (see detailed description of fixed text in Section 3.2) and used a
small dataset built from samples collected from a group of 22 users. Meanwhile for
the discriminability analysis performed by Balagani et al. [5], the authors used fixed
text like in this paper, but again used a small population of 33 users and compared
discriminability between heterogeneous and aggregate keystroke feature vectors, as
opposed to a feature by feature evaluation which we use in this work. W ith all th at
said, the performance analysis methodology used in [5, 40] differs from the approach
taken in this paper, since none of the two works subjected the observed differences
difference in discriminative power seen across features to formal statistical tests of
significance. The absence of formal statistical analysis particularly makes it hard to
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generalize the findings (such as the means and standard deviations reported in [40])
to keystroke dynamics in general [41].

CHAPTER 3
KEYSTROKE EXPERIMENTS
3.1 O verview
We collected several thousand typing samples in four 3-week events, spread
over a 2-year period between 2009 and 2011. All typists were staff, students and
faculty of Louisiana Tech University. Table 3.1 summarizes the details of the dataset
used in our experiments.
T ab le 3.1: Summary of dataset details
D a te
Oct
Apr
Oct
Oct

2009
2010
2010
2011

G ender
Male Female
589
412
690
488
692
507
521
715

F irs t L an g u ag e
English
Other
-

-

967
974
1007

205
216
221

Left
-

100
112
117

H a n d e d n e ss
Right Ambidextrous
-

1051
1052
1046

-

22
21
24

The missing values are because some details were not captured during the first
phase of experiments when the project had just been initiated. Observe th at the total
number of users may appear inconsistent in some of the phases. For example, the sum
of male and female typists in the April-2010 dataset is 1178, yet the sum of English
and non English speakers for the same phase of experiments is 1172. The reason for
the discrepancy is th a t some users opted not to fill certain fields of the questionnaire
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handed out before the typing exercise. The sum of female and male typists however
reflects the actual total typing population for each phase.

3.2 Typing Samples
While a wide range of samples were collected during the study, this work
focuses on samples which were collected as fixed text. W ith fixed text, a user types
a memorized word or very short sentence th at constitutes little or no cognitive load.
Such text closely mimics basic authentication in which a password or short passphrase
may be typed by a user at log-in time. The ideal way to collect such text is by having
users type their actual passwords, for which they must have developed a natural
typing pattern over time. Unfortunately this option has major security implications
and is generally not used in keystroke research. Past works simulated fixed text entry
in two ways- some studies used a common password string (typically having about
8-10 characters) across all users [6, 2], while others used a short sentence th at could
be easily memorized by users [5]. The usage of a sentence in the latter category
of works was mainly motivated by the need to investigate how some modalities of
fixed text keystroke authentication {e.g., classification accuracies) depend on variables
such as the identities of characters making up users’ passwords (or passphrases), or
authentication-string lengths such as in [5]. In such cases, the limited number of
characters in a short password string would limit the scope of analysis.
Because our work involved investigations on a wide range of variables, we also
used a sentence to simulate fixed text entry, and had users type the phrase “/ am
an Undergraduate Student of Louisiana Tech U niversity. Our belief is th at subsets
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of this phrase should give a plausible approximation of the nature of real passwords.
Also, with most of the users in our study being undergraduate students of Louisiana
Tech University, we figured th at the words in this phrase would be familiar and easy
to memorize.
To simulate password entry in our experiments, it was crucial th a t the char
acter distribution in our fixed text reflected the character distribution seen in real
passwords. Table 3.2 compares the frequencies of the different characters in our typing
sample with those in three recently hacked password lists (details of the three lists
— i.e., the Singles.org, Myspace.com and phpBB.com password lists can be found in
[20, 42]). The tabulated summary of the password character percentages is compiled
from the statistics published in [42].
T ab le 3.2: Frequencies of the most common characters in passwords found on 3
recently hacked password lists compared with frequencies of the same characters in
the phrase studied in this work.
C h a r a c te r
e
a
0
s
i
n
r
t
u
TOTAL

P a ssw o rd L ist
Singles.org Myspace.com
7.71%
8.84%
7.00%
8.13%
6.01%
5.46%
5.60%
4.89%
5.42%
4.84%
5.18%
4.28%
5.08%
4.69%
3.78%
3.55%
2.54%
2.29%
50.58%
44.71%

phpBB.com
8.95%
8.79%
6.32%
5.93%
5.24%
5.32%
6.13%
4.78%
3.26%
49.4%

P h r a s e U se d in
th is W o rk
10.0%
12.0%
4.00%
6.00%
8.00%
10.00%
6.00%
10.00%
10.00%
76%

For the password lists, the 3 tabulated values in each row represent the number
of times a character appears on the list as a percentage of the total number of
characters on the list. The value tabulated for our phrase is the number of times
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a character appears in the phrase as a percentage of the total number of characters
in the phrase. Our percentages do not exactly match those in the lists, although it
is clear th at we captured many of the most frequently occurring characters on the
password lists. Note th at the very low frequency of special characters in the hacked
password lists (full statistics can be found in [42]) supports the omission of these
characters from our study.
During the typing sessions, users easily memorized the phrase, and quickly
got into their regular typing rhythm after just a few trials. Whenever the system
detected an error after the user had typed the full string, the parser prompted the
user to re-enter the string afresh, like is done in regular password entry1. All typing
was done using DELL QWERTY keyboards. Across the several typing phases, users
provided 12 to 20 samples of this string during each typing session.

3.3 Keystroke Features and Pre-processing M ethod
3.3.1 Keystroke Features
For every key typed by a user, there are two associated time stamps—the time
when the key is pressed, and the time when the key is released. Figure 3.1 illustrates
these time stamps for the digraph H I, with P h representing the time when the letter
H is pressed, R h representing the time when letter H is released, and the time stamps
for the letter I defined similarly. For the digraph H I, three independent features can
be derived from the raw time stamps. These are the Key Hold Time, K H T h of letter
1The program used during the last phase of experiments did not have this parsing module. For
data collected during that phase, we scanned the data after it was collected and eliminated a given
typing instance of the passphrase if it had at least one error.
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H , the Key Interval Time, K I T h i between H and I, and the Key Hold Time, K H T i
of letter I. These features can respectively be calculated as: K H T'h = R h — P h ,
K I T h i = Pi — R h and K H T i = R i — Pi, with K I T h i assuming a negative value if
I is pressed before H is released.
i k

KHTh

kk

KHT,

KITh,

1 r

V

►
T im e

-------------

H

RH

R.

F ig u re 3.1: An illustration of the “atomic” features used in keystroke dynamics.

From these three “atomic” features, a number of other features can be derived
to represent a user’s typing pattern for the digraph H I. Examples of these features
include the up — up time {— R i — R h or K H T i + K I T h i ), the down —down time
(= Pi — PH or K H T h + K I T Hi ), and the total time required to type the full digraph
(= R i — P h or K H T h + K I T hi + K H T i). For longer words, additional features
can be derived from the “atomic” features to express the time interval between any
sequence of adjacent characters within the word. For instance in a word made of 5
characters, n-graphs can be defined {e.g., trigraphs, 4-graphs, 5-graphs [40, 43]) in
addition to the set of features already described above. Because the bulk of keystroke
features are just linear combinations of the “atomic” features (i.e., the K H T s and
K I T s ) , most keystroke verification systems are designed to use these two features
(for summary statistics of which studies have used which features refer to [5, 6]). In
order to make a thorough analysis while avoiding duplications, this dissertation thus
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also focuses on the K H T s and K I T s . We believe th at their properties will provide
insights into the properties of the other kinds of features.

3.3.2 Outlier Filtering
Over the several samples collected from each user, uncharacteristically long
pauses could occur at various points in the string and pollute the user’s tem plate if
not filtered out. For each feature, we use the distance-based outlier detection method
in [44] to filter out outliers from each user’s samples before using the data for our
statistical analysis. In this method, a point is considered an inlier if 68% of all the
points are within 100 ms of it. These thresholds were fixed heuristically in [44], and
have been found to perform well in a number of other works (see an example in [9]).

CHAPTER 4
KEYSTROKE FEATURE PROPERTIES
In this section we present the keystroke feature traits seen across our dataset.
We discuss their implications to keystroke dynamics research and to the design of
statistical attacks in particular. For all statistical tests performed, we report results
based on a critical value of a = 5%.

4.1 D is trib u tio n o f K ey H o ld a n d In te r-k e y T im es
O b s e rv a tio n # 1: All KH Ts and K ITs extracted from our fixed-phrase, “I am
an undergraduate student of Louisiana Tech University”, did not obey a Gaussian
distribution

E v id en c e to S u p p o rt O b se rv a tio n # 1 : We used the Lilliefors [45] and
Cramer-von Mises [46] tests to formally check whether keystroke feature data follows
the normal distribution. A modification of the Kolmogorov Smirnov (K-S) test [47],
the Lilliefors test returns a more accurate P-value (than the K-S test) when the
parameters of the hypothesized distribution are not completely specified during the
test [45]. We included the Cramer-von Mises test in our hypothesis testing routine
for the purpose of checking the result returned by the Lilliefors test, since different
categories of normality tests may sometimes fail to agree on the distribution followed
25
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by a given dataset. For both normality tests and other statistical tests performed in
this work, we used the R [48] statistical programming environment.
We ran the two normality tests for all features extracted from the fixed-phrase
(57 KITs and 58 KHTs). For instance, to test whether the KITs of digraph GR
followed a Gaussian distribution, we created a vector V qr containing every user’s
latencies for digraph GR, from which we derived another vector VGR, containing 5000
latencies th at were randomly selected from V qr ■ The normality tests were performed
on the vector V'GR. For every feature extracted from the fixed-phrase, we repeated
the process as done for digraph GR.
Our method of performing the hypothesis testing on random sub-samples
(rather than the full population), has also been used in past work [49, 50], and is
motivated by the fact th at large datasets tend to have statistically inexact descrip
tions, which in tu rn makes it hard for a goodness-of-fit test to produce meaningful
results if directly applied to the whole dataset [49]. For each normality test performed,
our null hypothesis was th a t the latencies in the test vector came from the normal
distribution. The alternative hypothesis was th at the elements of the vector did not
follow the normal distribution. For each vector tested, we rejected the null hypothesis
for both the Lilliefors and Cramer-von Mises tests.
Note th a t while we perform a very large number of tests, we do not make any
corrections (such as Bonferroni) on the critical values (of the Gaussianity tests and
all other tests performed in the study) because each test checks a different hypothesis.
For instance since we aim to study the distribution followed by each individual feature
in our test-phrase, the test whether digraph GR followed a Gaussian distribution is
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distinct from the test whether digraph LO followed a Gaussian distribution. For this
reason our result-reporting throughout the dissertation is centered around identifying
and counting the number of features of a certain type for which a certain hypothesis
holds or fails to hold.
Figure 4.1 shows the quantile-quantile(Q-Q) plots [51] for two features which
illustrate the general trend seen across the dataset (See [52] for more visualizations
of feature distributions.). A Q-Q plot compares the quantiles of one sample against
the quantiles of another. If the samples come from the same distribution, the plot
will be linear even if one distribution is shifted or re-scaled from the other. In our
plots, keystroke feature d ata is compared with samples drawn from the Gaussian
distribution. For instance the Q-Q plot in Figure 4. la compares the KITs of digraph
S I with data generated from the standard normal distribution.
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(a) Q-Q plot for KITs of digraph SI
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(b) Q-Q plot for the KHTs of letter T

F ig u re 4.1: Q-Q plots demonstrating the goodness-of-fit of the normal distribution
for selected keystroke features.

The figure shows th at the KITs of digraph S I (Figure 4.1a) depicted a signifi
cant positive skew as evidenced from the sharp departure from the straight (normal)
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line. On the other hand, the KHTs of letter T (Figure 4.1b) demonstrated a less
pronounced departure from the normal distribution, although both features ultimately
failed the normality test. We observed the tra it depicted in Figures 4.1a and 4.1b
across many features and concluded th a t some features were more Gaussian-like than
others despite all features returning very low P values.
Im p a c t o f O b se rv a tio n # 1 o n K e y stro k e R esearch : The fact th at all
the features in our fixed-phrase fail the Gaussian test suggests th at past studies such
as [53, 16] which have built entirely on the Gaussian assumption across all features,
could see improved results if features derived from the typing samples used in those
works had been closely studied to determine which ones are more accurately modeled
by the Gaussian distribution.
For the designer of a statistical attack, this non-Gaussian behavior explains
why a simple generative model th at uses the means and standard deviations as
the central reference parameters during forgery generation may not always work
well. In the attacks launched in this work, these findings prompt us to focus on
a non-parametric attack-design, in which we explicitly work with individual feature
histograms, without globally assuming Gaussian behavior of the keystroke features.

4.2 K e y stro k e F e a tu re D isc rim in a b ility
In this section we investigate the discriminative power of the different keystroke
features extracted from our typing samples.
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O b s e r v a tio n # 2: In comparisons made between each K IT and each K H T
extracted from our fixed phrase, we rejected the null hypothesis that a K H T was as
discriminative as a K IT in favor of the alternative hypothesis that a K IT was more
discriminative than a K H T in 98% of the comparisons. Also, we found that certain
K ITs had considerably higher discriminative power than the rest of the KITs, just like
certain KH Ts had considerably higher discriminative power than the rest o f the KH Ts
E v id en c e to S u p p o rt O b s e rv a tio n # 2 : To study feature discriminability,
we use the Bhattacharyya distance metric [40] to estimate the extent of overlap
between the pdfs of users’ features.

Equation 4.1 shows the definition of the B-

hattacharyya distance, D B for the pdfs ufix) and ufix). A Bhattacharyya distance
of 1 means th at two pdfs overlap completely while a distance of 0 means the pdfs
do not overlap at all. The more the overlap, the poorer the discriminability of the
feature in question for the pair of users under study.
(4.1)
The first step in the D B computation is to empirically estimate the pdfs, ufix)
and

Uj(x),

representing the latencies of users i and j for a given feature. To this end

we use the binning approach advocated by [40], in which the clock resolution used
to time-stamp keystroke events is set as the bin size. W ith both ufix) and u fix)
partitioned into bins, we multiply probabilities associated with corresponding bins,
take the square root of each product, and then sum the results over all bins to obtain
D b between the two pdfs. This discrete implementation of Equation 4.1 was also
used in [40].
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For each of the 115 features in our dataset, we compute D b as explained
above, using a set of 3000 randomly selected user-pairs. Each user-pair (represented
by the pdfs

Uj ( x )

and

Uj ( x) )

results into a single value of D b , which means th a t our

computation produces a vector containing 3000 D B values for each feature. Let Dfl
denote the vector of Bhattacharyya distances associated with the feature /?, and D j2
denote a similar vector for the feature f 2. Each of these vectors contains 3000 D B
values for the 3000 user-pairs. The vectors are such th at the user-pair corresponding
to the D b value in the ith position in vector D fx is the same user-pair corresponding
to the ith entry in vector D f2. The ith element in the vector A D f — D fx — D j2 is thus
the difference between the discriminabilities (Bhattacharyya distances) of features f t
and fg for the ith pair of users.
To determine whether the vector A D f pointed to a significantly large difference
in discriminability between the features f i , and fg, we used the Wilcoxon signed-rank
test [54]. We zeroed on this test after finding th a t the differences-vectors across the
population were far from Gaussian (based on observation of Q-Q plots and P values
returned by Lilliefors normality test). The test generally “measures the tendency of
one sample to contain values th at are larger than those in another sample [55]” , and
is known to be robust when the testing distributions are non-normal [6]. Even where
the parent populations are Gaussian, this test does not perform much worse than the
t-test [56, 57].
A critical requirement of this test is th at the vector A D f should be sym
metrically distributed around some median. Real-world data being rarely perfectly
symmetric however, the test is often applied when data is approximately symmetric
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[58], since the less restrictive alternative non-parametric test (i.e., the Sign test [59]),
is generally considered less powerful1 than the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. In this work
we used the rules of thumb in [60] (in addition to visual inspection of histograms in
some cases) to check for the symmetry of our A D j vectors. According to these rules,
a distribution is considered approximately symmetric if its skewness is between -0.5
and 0.5, moderately skewed if its skewness is between -1 and -0.5 or between 1 and
0.5, and highly skewed if the skewness is less than -1 or greater than 1.
When f i and f 2 were both KHTs, all A D f vectors th a t we computed were
approximately symmetric. Meanwhile in cases where both f i and f 2 were KITs, the
vast majority (?» 95%) of A D f vectors were approximately symmetric, with a few ( «
5%) being moderately skewed. Cases where / i was a KHT and f 2 was a KIT exhibited
behavior th at was in between the previous two cases. These results prompted us to
conclude th a t the Wilcoxon signed-rank test was appropriate for our data.

(See

Appendix A for some symmetry results highlights).
The discriminability investigations conducted in this work were divided into
two parts: In the first part, we sought to establish the extent to which the dis
criminative power of KITs generally compared to th at of KHTs. As such, we made
our computations in such a way th at for each pair of features compared, ft was a
KHT while f 2 was a KIT. The null hypothesis for the Wilcoxon signed-rank test
performed on each of these pairs was th at the vector A D f — D fx — D f2 followed a
continuous symmetric distribution with zero median, which implied th a t the difference
1The lower power of this test relative to the Wilcoxon signed-rank test is mostly attributed to
the fact that it uses limited information about the data, as it only takes into consideration the
arithmetic signs of the elements in A D f , and not their magnitudes [59].
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A D f between the Bhattacharyya distance-vectors of features fi and fs over the
population was insignificant. The alternative hypothesis was th at A D f, came from
a continuous symmetric distribution with median greater than zero, which implied
th at the KHT represented by fi had higher Bhattacharyya distances (and hence lower
discriminability) than the KIT represented by / 2 over the population .
Since our typing sample contained 57 KITs and 58 KHTs, we made a total
of 3306 (= 57 x 58) hypothesis tests since each KIT was tested against each KHT.
We rejected the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative hypothesis in about 98%
(3239 of 3306) of the tests, an indication th a t for the vast majority of tests, we could
not find evidence to suggest th at a KHT was as discriminative as a KIT. Figure 4.2
provides a visual perspective of how the discriminability of KHTs in our test-phrase
compared to th at of the KITs.
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F ig u re 4.2: Comparing mean Battacharyya distances associated with KITs with
those associated with KHTs in our typing samples
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The figure compares the mean Bhattacharyya distances of the KITs side-byside with those of the KHTs extracted from our typing samples over the population.
Following the notation used throughout this section, the mean Bhattacharyya dis
tance of a feature f x is computed by dividing the sum of the elements in vector
by 3000. This value will give some measure of how a feature such as f x discriminated
between each pair of users over the 3000 user-pairs. For each of the 58 KHTs in our
typing samples, we compute this mean value, and plot a CDF of the full array of
mean values on Figure 4.2. We do the same for the 57 KITs in our sample.
As shown in Figure 4.2, KITs were more discriminative on average, as over 80%
of them were associated with a mean Bhattacharyya distance of less than 0.6, while
about the same percentage were associated with a mean Bhattacharyya distance of
more than 0.6 for the case of the KHTs. These results support our findings from the
hypothesis tests, as they provide confirmation th at the KITs were more discriminative
than the KHTs.
In our further investigations, we sought to establish how discriminability varied
across KITs and across KHTs. This way, we should be able to determine if any KITs
were considerably more (or less) discriminative than the rest of the KITs, and if any
KHTs were considerably more (or less) discriminative than the rest of the KHTs. We
thus performed a set of hypothesis tests in which both f x and /g were KITs or KHTs.
Due to space limitations we only present results from these tests for a few
pairs of KHTs and KITs th at are enough to support our conclusions on the disparity
in the discriminability of different keystroke features. Based on P values th at were
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approximately equal to zero, we rejected the hypotheses th a t2: 1) digraph U I was as
discriminative as digraph —O, 2) digraph I S was as discriminative as digraph —O, 3)
digraph D E was as discriminative as digraph O F, 4) letter S was as discriminative
as letter M , and 5) letter N was as discriminative as letter I. Across the full dataset,
we observed a number of features which were significantly much more discriminative
than the others.

Im p a c t o f O b se rv a tio n # 2 o n K e y stro k e R esearch : Over the several
decades of research on keystroke dynamics, very few papers (such as in [61, 16])
have applied feature selection during the keystroke tem plate building process. W ith
results in this section revealing certain features in our test-phrase to be significantly

more discriminative than others, our work should motivate research on how feature
selection could be employed to build users’ profiles based on the most discriminative
features. We believe th a t this direction of research could potentially improve the
performance of keystroke verification systems.
Specific to the statistical attacks launched in this work, these findings on
feature discriminability will be crucial for our feature-space enumeration strategy.
Details of this strategy are discussed in Section 5.2 during our description of the
attack.

2The hyphen represents the space character
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4.3 In te r- F e a tu re D ep en d en cies
In this section we study the dependencies between the keystroke features.
O b se rv a tio n # 3 : For a large number of feature-pairs in our fixed phrase, we
found evidence to indicate that one feature depended on the other.

E v id en c e to S u p p o rt O b se rv a tio n # 3 : To study the dependencies exhib
ited by our keystroke data, we computed the mutual information between keystroke
features. In contrast to measures such as the Pearson correlation which are sensitive
to linear dependencies, mutual information measures correlation in general terms,
and is sensitive to both linear and non-linear associations between variables. For two
random variables X and Y , the mutual information I ( X ; Y ) is defined as:

(4 2 )

where P x and Py are respectively the probability mass functions (pmf) of X and
Y , and Px y is the p m f of the joint distribution between the two random variables.
I ( X \ Y ) expresses the reduction in uncertainity of variable X given variable Y . In
our experiments, the random variables X and Y correspond to two different keystroke
features. Details of how we pre-process the keystroke feature data for I ( X \ Y ) com
putation follow:
Let f i j denote the value of the j th feature during the ith typing attem pt of a us
er, where

1 < i < n, 1 < j < m. The vector V = £ • ( £ f a
i= l

£ fa
i= l

£
i= 1

f

a

'

**£

Am)

i= l

is the feature-means vector for each user. For many keystroke verification algorithms,
this vector is the main building block of a user’s profile (e.g., see [6] for a survey),
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and is the basis against which feature vectors extracted from later typing attem pts
are judged to match (or not match) the user’s typing pattern. We use this vector to
represent each user’s typing pattern during our mutual information computations.
For each user we first compute the vector V, and then create a

2

dimensional

matrix, M, whose every row is the vector V, computed for a different user. For a
group of k users, M is a k x m matrix, for which the j th column (1 < j < m) is a
vector, Uj, in which each element is the mean value of feature j for one of the k users.
Our computation of I ( X ; T ) between keystroke features will be based on pairs of the
vectors Uj, since each of these vectors represents a single feature over the population.
For a pair of features identified by the indices j = 1 and j = 2, we first bin
the associated vectors U\ and U2 (corresponding to X and Y in Equation 4.2) using
the approach described in Section 4.2, before applying Equation 4.2 to calculate
the mutual information between the two feature vectors.

To determine whether

the amount of mutual information between U\ and U2 is statistically significant, we
perform the mutual information perm utation test [62, 63], with the null hypothesis
being th a t the expected mutual information between the two vectors is zero (i.e., th at
the two vectors are independent). The alternative hypothesis is th at the two vectors
are dependent on each other. Since our test phrase has 115 features (=57KITs and
58KHTs) there are ( ^ ^ = 6555 possible feature pairings. We run this test for each
of the 6555 feature-pairs.
Before presenting the results, we define what we term as similar features. We
refer to multiple instances of a given digraph, (or onegraph) in a word as a set of
similar features. For example, since the word STU D E N T has two instances of the
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letter T, we refer to a feature-pair comprised of the KHTs of the two Ts as having
similar features. We report results from the mutual information tests on such featurepairs separately from those of the rest of the feature-pairs comprised of dissimilar
features because high amounts of mutual information between similar features could
give a deceptive view of how keystroke features depended on each other in general.
For tests run on feature-pairs comprising of similar features, we rejected the
null hypothesis (i.e., the hypothesis th at vectors in a pair were independent) in
85% of the tests, an indication th at the way in which users typed a key gave a
significant amount of information about how they typed the same key at different
locations within the typing sample. Meanwhile for the tests run on feature-pairs
containing dissimilar features, we rejected the null hypothesis (of independence)
in over 40% of the cases, an indication th at even some of the dissimilar features
exhibited dependencies. Table 4.1 captures the inter-feature dependencies in terms
of conditional probabilities of the form P ( f\ < a \ f i < fi).

Table 4.1: Conditional probabilities between KITs of selected digraphs.
Event
P (K IT AD <
P (K IT ad <
P {K IT ad <
P (K IT UN <
P (K IT -u <
P (K IT CH <

100 | K I T h _ <
100 | K I T at <
100 | K I T du <
150 | K I T ra <
150 | K I T ra <
150 | K I T ra <

100)
100)
100)
150)
150)
150)

Probability
0.50
0.51
0.51
0.59
0.30
0.98

The features (/i and / 2), and thresholds (a and /3) used in the table axe chosen
arbitrarily to give an example of how the extent of dependency between certain
features could (or could not) aid statistical inferences about the features. The
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represents the space character. Take the case of digraph R A for instance. A user
who typed the digraph R A in under 150ms was very likely to type digraphs C H in
under 150ms, very unlikely to type digraph —U in under 150ms, and moderately likely
to type digraphs U N in under 150ms. This means th at an adversary who knew how
users were likely to type the digraph R A in our typing sample could (potentially) have
lowered the search space for the digraphs C H , U— and U N during an attack against
a randomly selected user. Not all inter-feature probabilities (for different thresholds
a,/3) were th a t interesting however. For instance, a user who typed digraphs DU,
A T or H- in under 100 ms had almost equal likelihood of typing digraph AD in over
100ms as in under 100 ms. In this case an adversary seeking to determine if a random
user typed digraph AD in under 100 ms could not benefit much from the knowledge
th at the victim (or a typical user) typed the digraphs DU, A T or H- in under 100 ms.

Im p a c t o f O b se rv a tio n # 3 o n K e y stro k e R esearch : While biometric
features are typically associated with dependencies and correlations [64], no previous
work has investigated the extent of these dependencies in keystroke dynamics to the
best of our knowledge. Our findings thus represent the first empirical evaluation of
the dependencies exhibited by keystroke features, and should influence:— 1 ) Analytic
work such as [5] in which assumptions regarding keystroke feature dependencies are
used to aid investigations into various aspects of keystroke dynamics; and 2) The
design of statistical attacks th at build off of the inter-feature dependencies to break
keystroke systems. The latter direction of research should in tu rn motivate work on
defences against these types of attacks before they take root in real systems. Our
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attacks in this work actually also exploit the feature dependencies, as we use the
conditional probabilities between features to make decisions on how to traverse the
search space.

CHAPTER 5
THE KEYSTROKE STATISTICAL ATTACKS
In this section we discuss the underlying assumptions, implementation details
and performance of the statistical attack on the fixed-text keystroke authentication
system.

5.1 A ssu m p tio n s a n d A tta c k S cenarios
A s su m p tio n #

1

: We assume th at the adversary knows the victim’s password

and has access to keystroke forging software. We discussed these two issues and
provided accompanying evidence during our discussion in Chapter 1. We thus do not
re-emphasize them here. Perhaps the only point we have to add is th a t although
different keystroke verifiers may be based on different features, the attacker does not
have to know about these features, since the verification system will automatically
parse the bot-injected samples for the right features in the same way it would for a
human typist.
A s su m p tio n #

2

: We assume th at the attacker will be able to access large

amounts of keystroke d ata so as to extract the keystroke feature statistics needed to
design the attack. One obvious option available to the adversary is to use accomplices
to provide biometrics samples for the password in question. Ballard et al. [65] also
cite this data collection option in their paper on synthetic attacks against handwritten
40
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signatures. Other possibilities include crowdsourcing with the aid of fake keylogging
Web sites, directly extracting feature statistics from publicly accessible keystroke
datasets, or even fooling unsuspecting users at a public Cyber Cafe so as to have
them type a common pass code (matching the victim’s authentication data) for access
while a key logger captures keystroke sequences.
A tta c k Scenarios: Our main attack scenario is the case of an adversary who
uses a personal machine to attack other users via the Internet. If for instance Bob
wants to launch an attack against a keystroke-protected Facebook account owned by
Alice, Bob only has to make authentication attem pts at the Facebook server using
attack-software installed on his own machine. The attack is thus not affected by any
host-based defences (such as the one in [6 6 ]) deployed at Alice’s machine since the
injection of synthetic keys is done at the attacker’s own machine.
In high security applications such as online banking, the server may, in addition
to Alice’s password and keystroke signature also authenticate the IP address used by
Alice to make her transactions. This means th a t Bob, seated at his own compromised
computer may not be able to make successful authentication attem pts against Alice’s
account. Our attack may hence only work in th at case if Bob can have physical access
to Alice’s machine so as to compromise any defences and (or) install and launch the
keystroke forging software. This attack scenario will be much less likely than the first,
but cant be ruled out given a committed adversary.
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5.2 The Attack Algorithm
Algorithm 1 shows how our attack extracts features from a user’s password,
and how it uses population data to generate feature values to be used for attack.
For each distinct KHT and KIT in the victim’s password, the algorithm bins the
associated latencies over the population using a bin size defined by the value of the
binSize parameter, and then returns the centers of the h highest frequency bins.
A L G O R IT H M

1 : Generating feature outputs to be used for tree traversal

In p u t:

User’s password string / / E . g . , ABAB;

In p u t:

KD population data corresponding to password string

O u t p u t : Matrix of feature outputs for each feature
KHTs [ ]«—Distinct characters in password / / E . g . , KHTs=[A B] fo r s tr in g ABAB;
KITs [ ]<—Distinct digraphs in password / / E . g . , KITs=[AB BA] fo r s t r in g ABAB;
Features [ ]f-[KHTs

KITs] / / E . g . , Features=[A B AB BA];

NumberOfFeatures-<—NumberOf(Features)// Number0fFeatures=4 fo r s t r in g ABAB;
for *<— 1

to N um ber O f F ea tu res/ / Assume low est array index i s 1 fo r s im p lic ity ;

do
BinnedFeature[i]<—Binning(Features[i], binSize);
//U s e a bin s iz e o f b in S ize to b in th e la t e n c ie s of F e a t u r e s [ i] .
b in s so rted in descending order of p ro b a b ility ;

Return

for j<- 1

to h d o
F[i,j]«—SelectDominantBins(BinnedFeature[i], h);

//E ach pass through inner loop a ssig n s cen ter of j th b in of
F ea tu re [i] to th e array lo c a tio n F [ i , j ] ;
/ / E . g . , For KHT o f A (se e Figure 5 . 1 ) , we s h a ll have F [l, 1] = A : V\ ,

F[1,2] = A : V 2, F[l,3] = A :V rs ;
Return F //M a trix co n ta in in g a t o t a l of h outputs fo r each featu re;

Take the password string A B A B for instance. The KHTs of A and B and
the KITs of A B and BA are respectively the distinct KHTs and KITs extracted
from this password string. Across the population, the algorithm extracts and bins
the latencies corresponding to each of these four features, and then determines the
centers of the h highest frequency bins in each of the four cases. We heuristically
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set the binSize parameter as 16 m s since this value gave us good results during
our experiments. The function BinningQ performs the binning process, while the
function SelectD om inantB insQ returns the centers of the most frequent bins. We
set the value of h as 3 in this work, implying th at Algorithm

1

(or the function

SelectD om inantB insQ in particular) returns three bin centers for each of the four
features.
For a feature such as the KHT of A, we use the notation A : Vi, A : V2 and
A .

\

3

to refer to the 3 bin centers returned by Algorithm 1. The first (i.e., A : Vi)

corresponds to the highest frequency bin while the last (i.e., A : V3 ) corresponds to
the lowest frequency bin. During the search process, these three values per feature
will account for only a small portion of the search space, but should be sufficient to
illustrate the power of the attack.
Note th at since the binning is explicitly built off of empirical data, rather than
off of parametric density functions (say, under the Gaussian assumption), the highest
probability bin will not necessarily be centered at the population mean. Additionally,
for features having skewed or multi-modal distributions, a sequence of high probability
bins may be located at the same side of the population mean, which would also not
be the case under the Gaussian assumption.
We formulate the feature-space enumeration process as a tree traversal in
which each tree level represents a feature. Figure 5.1 illustrates the structure of this
tree for the hypothetical password A B A B . The figure is motivated by the attack tree
used for the analysis of Biometrics Cryptographic Key Generators (BKGs) in [64],
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KHTs

F ig u re 5.1: Enumerating the keystroke feature space for the hypothetical password
ABAB.
although we use a completely different algorithmic framework tuned to exploit our
observed statistical traits.
The enumeration process begins by setting the output value of the feature
located at the root of the tree. Before delving into the criteria for determining which
feature to be located at the root of the tree, lets assume th a t this feature is the KHT
of A, for the case of the hypothetical password used for our illustrations. Of the three
possible values th a t can be assumed by the KHT of A, the algorithm sets the largest
(i.e., A : Vi, corresponding to the most frequent bin) as the output of feature A at
this stage. The next output to be set is th at of the KHT of B , located at the level
just below the root node. Of the three possible values, B : Vi, B : V2 and B : V3
th a t can be assumed by the KHT of B , the algorithm then selects the one which
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maximizes the conditional probability, P (B = B : Vn | A = A : V\), for n = 1,2,3.
This process continues down the tree, with the output at each tree level being based
on the conditional probabilities between the possible outputs at the particular tree
level, and the current output at the level just above.
The first guessing attempt is realized when the enumeration process first reach
es the leaves of the tree. We define a guessing attempt as a set whose cardinality equals
the number of levels in the feature enumeration tree, with every element in the set
being an output of a feature from a different level of the tree. For our hypothetical
example, the first guessing attem pt could for instance take up the values in the set
Gi = (A : V\, B : Vs, A B : V3, B A : Vi), where the four elements of the set respectively
correspond to the outputs of the KHT of A, KHT of B , KIT of A B and KIT of B A .
These four elements of G\ are represented on the graph by the path indicated by the
sequence of short arrows.
Each subsequent guessing attem pt follows by modifying the output of a single
feature in the current guessing attem pt. These feature output modifications start
from the features located at the leaves, and recurse up the tree, using conditional
probabilities to guide decision making in the way already described.
For instance, assuming P (B A = B A
V3 | A B = A B

:

:

V2 \ A B = A B : V3) > P (B A

V3), the second guessing attem pt will be G2 = (A

V z,B A : V2), while the third guessing attem pt will be

G3

=

(A

:

Vi, B

: V \ ,B

:

:

=

BA :

V3, A B

:

V3, A B

:

V z,B A : V3). Meanwhile, the next three guessing attem pts will see the output of
feature A B modified to a new value, and the output of feature B A again iterated
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through its three possible values in accordance with the earlier described conditional
probability-based criteria.
Observe th a t between the first and third guessing attem pts (G x through G3),
the first three feature outputs (i.e., A : V i , B : V3 , A B : V3 ) are unchanged, while the
lowest feature (KIT of B A ) sees three different outputs. A direct consequence of tree
traversal techniques such as the one we employ, this trait means th a t a wrong output
for the KHT of A, or KHT of B , or KIT of A B , will have a negative impact on all
guesses G\ through (?3, while a wrong output for the KIT of B A will only impact the
individual associated guess. This problem generalists to all other guessing attem pts,
and is such th a t a wrong output for a feature located close to the root will result in
a greater amount of fruitless feature space enumeration than a wrong output for a
feature located at the leaves of the tree.
Since authentication systems impose limits on the number of perm itted false
authentication attem pts, its crucial th a t the tree design minimizes the extent of fruit
less search space enumeration. Our tree exploits information on the discriminability
of features to handle this problem.

Specifically, we ensure th a t the weaker (less

discriminative) features are located towards the root of the tree while the powerful
(more discriminative) features are located closer to the leaves of the tree. For two
features f \ and / 2 , we locate the feature f x above the feature

/ 2

in the tree if the

mean Battacharrya distance of f x across the population is greater than th a t of / 2. The
method used to compute the mean Battacharrya distance of a feature was described
in Section 4.2.
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5.3 Attack Samples
The choice of string lengths used for the attacks was based on two factors.
First, the summary statistics in [6 ], indicate th at past fixed text keystroke studies have
for the most part used strings ranging from

6

to 17 characters in length. Because we

needed our results to be easily put in the context of past findings, we decided to attack
this same range of string lengths. The second consideration behind our choice of string
lengths was the need to attack strings whose lengths are representative of the password
lengths being used today, as this would give a good reflection of the performance of a
password-KD system under a statistical attack in the current Internet setting. W ith
regard to this factor, we studied various recently hacked password lists from which
we observed average password lengths of about 6.62 to 7.88 characters [20].

We

took these average password lengths as some sort of password-length lower bound
and attacked substrings of length 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17 and 20. This large number of
password strings will help give a concrete view of how statistical attacks may perform
over a wide range of string lengths.

5.4 Keystroke Verifiers
To evaluate the success of the synthetic attack, we used the Z-score [6 ], Scaled
M anhattan [6 ] and Naive Bayes [5] verification algorithms. The first two were among
the best performers in a study th at compared up to 14 different fixed text KD verifiers
[6 ], while the third, despite not being part of the algorithms compared in [6 ], is very
popular in machine learning literature, readily available in the Weka machine learning
tool [67], and was recently shown in [5] to perform very well for the kind of fixed text
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heterogenous feature vectors used in this work. We implement the first two verifiers
from scratch and use the Weka implementation of the Naive Bayes classifier. A brief
description of each of the three verifiers follows:

5.4.1 Z-score Classifier
Given feature vectors extracted from a user’s keystroke data for a given string
over several typing runs, this verifier computes the mean and standard deviation
of each feature during the training phase. In the test phase, the absolute Z-score
between each feature of the test vector, and the corresponding feature in the mean
vector (created during the training phase) is computed. The anomaly score is a count
of how many z-scores exceed 1.96. If a* is the test value, and 6 * and s* are the mean
and standard deviation of feature i as seen during training, the z-score is computed
as z = (|flj - bi\/si).

5.4.2 Scaled M anhattan Classifier
This verifier uses a M anhattan-distance computation in which each dimension
is scaled by the average absolute deviation seen for each feature during the training
phase. In the training phase, the mean and the mean absolute deviation for each
of the features are computed. In the test phase, the anomaly score is computed as
Sf = 1

—bl\/yl where at and bi carry the same meaning as in the z score classifier,

and tji is the average absolute deviation of feature i during training.
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5.4.3 Naive Bayes Classifier
During training, the verifier builds a user’s model using maximum likelihood
estimation. In the test phase, it makes a classification decision basing on the probabil
ity th at a given set of latencies belongs to the user. Due to space limitations and the
fact th at the Naive Bayes verifier is well studied in literature, the reader is referred
to [44] for details on its mechanism and underlying assumptions.

5.5 Performance of the Attack
5.5.1 Overview:
To launch the attacks, we used templates from 110 users who participated
in at least 3 of the d ata collection phases. For each of the 110 users, we used data
from the first phase of our experiments for training1, and then used 30 instances
of the user’s d ata from the other typing phases to attack the user’s model so as to
generate the user’s genuine scores. To generate the impostor scores, we launched
impostor attem pts in 2 different ways. In the first approach, we used 50 randomly
selected impostors from a pool of

1 0 0 0

users to attack the tem plate (or model) built

for each user during training. Throughout the rest of the section, we shall refer to
this attack as a zero-effort attack [9], since it simulates an impostor who makes no
effort to im itate the genuine user’s way of typing. In the second approach, we used
50 of the top 1000 guesses generated by our attack algorithm to conduct impostor
1Unlike the first two classifiers, the Naive Bayes classifier requires instances of both the positive
and negative classes during training. For each participant we used as many instances of the negative
class as the participant had for the positive class during the first phase of our experiments.

50
attacks against each user. We shall interchangeably use the terms algorithmic attack
and statistical attack to refer to this form of attack.
The performance analysis in this section will focus on the comparison between
these two attacks, since our principal aim is to illustrate how our algorithmic attack
compares to the well known zero-effort attack which is still the benchmark for the
performance evaluation of keystroke dynamics systems. Central to our performance
evaluation methodology is the Equal Error Rate (EER), a measure which represents
the point at which a verifier’s false-reject and false-accept errors are equal. The
EER is often used to evaluate biometrics system performance [6 , 9], and is such th at
a low EER is synonymous with good performance, while a high EER implies poor
performance of a system. Some researchers prefer to express EER values on a scale
running from 0 to 100 [7]), while others use a scale running from 0 to 1 [6 ]. In this
work, we adopt the latter convention.
To calculate a user’s EER for a given type of attack, we construct a Detection
Error Tradeoff (DET) curve for the user, from which we determine the EER as the
point at which the curve meets the line y=x (i.e., point at False Reject Rate (FRR)
equals the False Acceptance Rate (FAR)). Figure 5.2 illustrates this procedure for a
certain user for both the zero-effort and algorithmic attacks. The profile under attack
was built for a 7-character string, and the algorithm used for verification was the NaiVe
Bayes algorithm. As indicated by the figure, this particular user’s performance was
negatively impacted by the algorithmic attack, given the high EER for this attack
relative to the zero-effort attack. For each of the seven string lengths used in this
study, we carry out this procedure for all 110 users and 3 verifiers, and eventually
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compute the mean EER and standard deviation of EERs over the population for the
attacks against each string length and verifier.

—

0.8

Zero Effort
Algorithmic
FRR=FAR

0.6

0.4
0.2
0.5
FRR

F ig u re 5.2: DET curves computed for the zero-effort and algorithmic attacks
launched against one of the users in our experiments.

5.5.2 G lo b a l Im p a c t o f th e A tta c k :
Below, we describe the major attributes of the of the attacks with regard to
the general behavior seen across the population.
1. Variance in EERs across the population:— For all verifiers and string lengths,
the algorithmic attack always caused a much higher variance in the average
EERs than the zero-effort attack (see Figure 5.3)2. Because reliable systems
are typically designed to have low variance in their performance metrics [6 8 ],
this increment in the variance of EERs, irrespective of whether the mean EERs
were affected or not, is the first indicator of why the algorithmic attack is a
major threat relative to the zero-effort attack. Further investigations into the
cause of this high variance (results not shown due to space limitations) revealed
2The error-bars indicate a single standard deviation from above and below the mean EER. Also
note that the EERs plotted on the graph have only been computed for password lengths of 7, 9, 11,
13, 15, 17 and 20 characters. The curve joining these points is only meant to show the general trend.
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th a t under the algorithmic attack, there was a small proportion of the userpopulation which saw almost zero EERs and another small proportion which saw
EERs almost close to 1. This kind of extreme behavior was not as pronounced
under the zero-effort attack, and naturally accounted for the higher variance
under the algorithmic attack. Regarding the cause of this high disparity in user
behavior under the algorithmic attack, the population statistics-based nature
of the attack indicates th at the well performing users had their typing traits
distinct from those of the general population, while the weak users’ group had
characteristics very similar to those of the population.
2. Mean EERs across the population:— For all verifiers and string lengths, the
algorithmic attack caused higher mean EERs than the zero-effort attack. The
long error bars associated with the algorithmic attack cause us to use a wide
scale (that unfortunately seems to dim the clarity of these EER changes),
however, Table 5.1 captures this behavior so well as it indicates th a t the EER
increments ranged from 0.11 for the 7-character string and the Naive Bayes
verifier, to 0.03 for the 20-character string and the Scaled M anhattan classifier.
While it may be tempting to write off these EER increments as trivial, they
are quite high, as they constitute a large percentage of the EERs seen under
the zero-effort attack. Observe for instance th a t the Naive Bayes verifier sees
increments of over 50% of the zero-effort EER, while the other two verifiers see
increments of over 30% of the zero-effort EERs for all string lengths. As a final
note on why these EER increments should represent a major threat in the sense
of a (keystroke) biometrics system, the reader is referred to [6], where an EER
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difference of just 0.075 separated the top ten verifiers in a study in which several
verifiers were compared.
T a b le 5.1: EER increments caused by the algorithmic attack.
S trin g
Size

7
9
11
13
15
17
20

K D V erificatio n A lg o rith m
N aiv e B ayes
Z -score
S caled M a n h a tta n
Increase % Increase Increase % Increase Increase % Increase
in mean
in mean
in mean
in mean
in mean
in mean
EER
EER
EER
EER
EER
EER
0.105
72.5
0.131
67.1
0.091
67.8
0.062
30.1
0.061
53.5
0.063
54.3
80.4
0.052
0.063
35.9
39.8
0.093
0.054
76.7
33.8
0.045
45.6
0.081
0.041
84.4
0.038
28.6
37.7
0.076
40.2
66.7
0.037
33.1
0.039
0.068
73.2
0.062
0.048
44.5
0.033
35.5

3. Impact of string length:— As the string lengths increased, the increments in
mean EER caused by the algorithmic attack for the most part saw a monotonic
decrement (save for 2 cases). The observed reduction in the impact of the attack
suggests th a t free text keystroke systems, by virtue of using long blocks of text
for verification could see much lower, or even no increment in EER, under the
kind of algorithmic attacks implemented in this paper.
5.5.3 E ffect o f th e A tta c k o n th e P e rfo rm a n c e o f In d iv id u a l U sers:
Having compared the mean system performance under the two attacks, we
proceeded to investigate the extent to which the algorithmic attack improved or
worsened each user’s performance relative to the zero-effort attack. For this analysis,
we subtracted each users EER under the zero-effort attack from th at under the
algorithmic attack and plotted a CDF of these differences.
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Figure 5.4 shows the full distribution of the EER changes for the 7 and 20
character strings over the population of users subjected to the two attacks. We focus
on the two extreme string lengths because they reflect and (or) bound the general
behavior exhibited across all string lengths. Highlights from this figure are discussed
below:
1. EER Variations of Individual Users:—The EERs of different users were im
pacted markedly differently by the attacks. While some users saw performance
improvement (reduced EERs) under the algorithmic attack, others saw consid
erably large increments in their EERs. For instance, under the Naive Bayes
verifier (Figure 5.4a), about 40% of the population saw improved EERs (EER
differences less than zero) under the algorithmic attack for both the 7 and 20
character strings, while about another 20% for the 7 character string, and over
15% for the 20-character string saw no change at all in their EERs. Meanwhile,
about 5% of the population saw EER increments greater than 0.5 for the 7
character string, while an even smaller number saw a similar increment for the
20-character string. This variation in users’ behavior is seen across all verifiers
and string lengths used for our study, and again points to the earlier mentioned
trait of certain user clusters being very similar to the population, while others
are very dissimilar to it. Additionally, the fact th at a small group of users
seem to be responsible for the increment in mean system EER suggests th a t a
targeted solution for the small group of poor users could be employed to control
the attack.
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(a) CDF of the changes in EER caused by the algorithmic attack
against the Naive Bayes verifier for each of the 110 users
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(b) CDF of the changes in EER caused by the algorithmic attack
against the Z-score verifier for each of the 110 users
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(c) CDF of the changes in EER caused by the algorithmic attack
against the Scaled Manhattan verifier for each of the 110 users
F ig u re 5.4: Effect of the algorithmic attack relative to the zero-effort attack for
individual users.
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2. Impact of String Length:—Figure 5.4 shows th at the proportion of users whose
change in EER exceeded zero was higher for the 7 character string than for the
20 character string across all verifiers. This observation explains the monotonic
decrease in mean EER with increased string length th at we highlighted earlier
in the discussion since the small proportion of users with increased EERs for
the long strings should naturally result into lower mean EERs for such strings.

CHAPTER 6
ROBOTIC IMITATIONS OF TOUCH GESTURES
6.1 Overview
Touch-based authentication—now widely studied for its potential to serve
as a second layer of defense to the PIN lock mechanism on mobile devices—has
traditionally been evaluated under the assumption of naive (zero-effort) adversaries.
The zero-effort threat model, although well understood not to be representative of the
state-of-the-art threats [69], is for several reasons fronted by researchers as being able
to sufficiently capture the threat th at a touch-based authentication system would face
in practice. For instance in one of the recent papers on touch biometrics, Frank et
al. [10] make the following arguments to rule out the need for stringent penetration
testing of their system:

....

we can hardly imagine someone learning the touch behavior of 30

features, such as pressure, distribution of acceleration, etc., just by looking
over the shoulder [10].

...A more successful but more involved attack would be to place a malware
application on the user’s device. This malware could learn and report the
touch pattern if the details of how to compute the features are known to
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the attacker... However, we argue that a user with malware on the device
has already lost the race against the attacker [10].

These arguments—echoed in many other papers—are sound without doubt.
Notably though, the notion th at these two attacks (malware and a form of shoul
der surfing) represent the full spectrum of threats th a t the system could face is
for several reasons debatable.

In this chapter we demonstrate that: 1) a simple

robotic/mechanical device (as opposed to malware) can very effectively degrade the
performance of a touch-based authentication system, and, 2) publicly accessible touch
biometrics d ata (such as the data at [70]) can be leveraged to drive the attacks
even where detailed information about the intended victim’s swiping behavior is not
available.
The chapter covers our data collection experiments, attack design and results
of the robotic attack.

6.2 D ata and Features U sed for our Investigations
6.2.1 D ata Collection Process
We conducted two data collection experiments using two Android applications
th a t captured the way in which users touched the mobile phone screen. The gestures
th a t users typically perform on a touch screen include zooming (in and out), clicking
(tapping), swiping to switch between screens (i.e., horizontal swiping) and swiping to
move a page up and down (vertical swiping). The tap gesture does not hold enough
information to strongly separate between a large group of users [10], while the zoom
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gesture does not occur frequently enough to guarantee th a t a continuous authenti
cation application will always have enough data to make classification decisions [10].
For these reasons, most work on continuous touch-based authentication hinges around
the two swipe gestures1. We focus on these two gestures in this work.
For each of a set of points on a touch stroke registered on the screen during
swiping, the applications recorded the: 1) x and y coordinates, 2) time at which the
finger touched the point in question, 3) area occluded between the finger and the
screen, 4) pressure exerted on the screen and 5) orientation of the phone (portrait or
landscape). The two Android applications basically simulated how users read text and
view images on the touch screen. Based on a short paragraph of text or an image, users
had to answer several questions by selecting one of two to four alternative answers th at
we provided per question. On reading a question, each user would scroll/swipe back
to the image or block of text containing clues to the solution, before scrolling/swiping
towards the answer section where the user would select one of the choices provided.
Both applications were based on the same idea, although each application
was based on a different set of questions/images. In the first phase of experiments
(Session I), users interacted with one application. They then returned on another day
at their convenience to interact with the second application (i.e., during Session II).
All participants used the same brand of phone—the Google Nexus S running Android
version 4.0—so as to avoid bias in our findings th at might be caused by differences
in the way in which different phones extract information from touch gestures.
xLi et al. [11] used the tap gesture in conjunction with the two swipe gestures. However they
found that it had very poor discriminability.
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6.2.2 Feature Extraction and Preprocessing
Before extracting features from the data, we performed an outlier filtering
step to eliminate very short strokes since these likely originated from click events (or
taps), as opposed to swiping (scrolling). Frank et al. [10] performed a similar step
on users’ strokes before proceeding with the classification process. Having removed
outliers, we extracted 28 features from each stroke. There is currently no universal
feature-set th a t researchers use to represent a distinct stroke. For example, Frank
et al. [10] defined 30 features and discarded 3 of them after feature analysis, Li et
al. [11] defined 13 features (or 14 features if the x and y coordinates of a point are
considered as distinct features) and discarded 4 of them after feature analysis while
Feng et al. [12] used 53 features. For this work we used 28 features th at we believe
best summarize the statistical attributes of a touch stroke. A description of how we
computed these features follows:
Using the pressure and area readings at different points along a stroke, we
respectively built a pressure vector, P , and an area vector, A, to represent the pressure
and area associated with the stroke. We computed the velocity between every pair
of consecutive points along a stroke, and used these values to generate the velocity
vector, V. Finally, for every pair of points in V , we computed the acceleration, and
generated an acceleration vector, A'.
For each of the four vectors A, P , V and A ', we computed five measures
to summarize a user’s mean behavior, variability in behavior and extreme behavior
along a stroke. These were: 1) lower quartile, 2) second quartile, 3) third quartile,
4) mean, and, 5) standard deviation. This gave a total of 20 (= 4x 5) features per
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stroke. The last

8

features making up a vector representing a stroke were: the x and

y coordinates of the starting points, the x and y coordinates of the end points, the
distance between the end and starting points of a stroke, the time taken to complete
the stroke, the tangent of the angle between the line joining the end-points of a stroke
and the horizontal, and the sum of distances between every pair of adjacent points
on a stroke.

6.3 Attack Design
6.3.1 General Assum ptions
We assume an adversary who gets physical access to a phone for which touchbased continuous authentication is the only active layer of defence. In practice, this
scenario may arise for an attacker who : 1) breaks the PIN lock mechanism {e.g., using
methods such as those in [25, 26]), or, 2) finds a phone in which the PIN lock has been
disabled temporarily {e.g., a user who sets a very long timeout for the PIN lock), or,
3) finds a phone in which the PIN lock has been completely disabled by the owner [10].
To be able to determine the amount of extra security th at touch-based continuous
authentication adds to the standard PIN lock in the worst case, we believe th a t these
assumption must necessarily be made. Also see [71], for an investigation in which a
similar assumption (i.e., th at the adversary has access to the victim ’s password) was
made in order to enable rigorous evaluation of the security of Randomized Biometric
Templates (RBTs).
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In the attack itself, the attacker will seek to view private information on the
phone {e.g., emails, pictures, etc.,) without triggering the anomaly detection mecha
nism. The attack thus basically proceeds by scrolling/swiping through documents on
the phone. In practice we believe th at the attacker could even assist the robot during
certain operations {e.g., occasionally clicking at a challenging location), since the
anomaly detector will most likely not be sensitive enough to detect a few anomalous
clicks. Next we discuss the underlying statistical observations th a t drive the attack,
and the details of the mechanical and algorithmic design of the robot.

6.3.2 How do People Swipe on the Phone?
To design the attacks, we first examine the way in which people swipe in
general. How random is swiping behavior across a population ? Are there certain
distinct traits th a t manifest frequently across a large number of users? This section
provides answers to these and related questions. Due to space limitations, we only
present results on the pressure exerted on the screen, the area between the finger and
the screen and the region of the phone at which most swiping is done. Other measures
such as the time interval between consecutive swipes, the velocity of the finger and
the length of a stroke, to mention but a few, are left out here but will be used in the
attack design.
Location of Swiping Activity. Figure D.12 shows the density of touch strokes
captured at different positions of the phone screen during the first phase of exper
iments.

The dark blue color corresponds to regions which saw very little or no

swiping/scrolling activity while a high intensity of red corresponds to regions which
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(a) Spatial distribution of swiping activity (b) Spatial distribution of swiping activity
during vertical swiping.
during horizontal swiping.
F ig u re
screen.

6

. 1 : Color map showing the spatial distribution of touch strokes on the phone

saw a lot of swiping. The phone was being used in portrait mode when the strokes
were generated. Note th at the coordinate system used on the figures is different from
th at used by the Android system. Observe (Figure D.12a) th at the vast majority
of vertical strokes generated by our user population originated from points having X
values in the neighborhood of 300 units, and term inated at a position with an X value
of close to 400 units (and vice versa). Notably, this region of high activity comprises
less than 50% of the screen display. The heart of the red region (which tends towards
black) occupies an even a much smaller portion of the screen. Similar traits (see
Figure D.12b) were seen with the horizontal swiping.
Based on evidence provided through this plot, an adversary with access to
general population statistics could potentially significantly narrow down the scope of
features such as:

1

) the x coordinate of the start point of a stroke, 2 ) the y coordinate

of the start point of a stroke, 3) the x coordinate of the end point of a stroke, 3) the
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y coordinate of the end point of a stroke, and, 4) the direction of the end-to end line,
among other features. These features represent a good proportion of the features
used to characterize users’ touch gestures in past research (such as in [1 0 ,

1 1

]), and

will also be used in this study.
Regarding the cause of the clustering tendency, our conjecture is th a t the high
density of strokes on the right side of the screen (i.e., taking the case of vertical swiping
for instance) was likely because the majority of users are right handed, tending to
hold the phone in the right hand and swiping with the thumb, or holding the phone
in the left hand and swiping using one of the fingers on the right hand. In any of
these two scenarios, a user is very likely to swipe in the manner reflected in the figure.
We do not rule out the possibility th at certain highly specialized applications could
depict variations from the pattern shown in the figure. In this case we argue th at a
committed attacker who has interest in breaking into such an application could easily
make research on the swiping trends for such an application.
Finger Area and Pressure on the Screen: Figure 6.2a shows the distribution
of the mean area touched by the finger and the mean pressure exerted on the screen
across a subset of our full user population. To plot the figures, we computed each
user’s mean area (and mean pressure) and plotted the results on the CDF. Observe
th a t over 80% of the population had a mean area of between 0.1 and 0.25 and th at
about 50% of the population had mean pressure values of between 0.4 and 0.6. These
user proportions already suggest th a t a large number of users could be clustered
around a narrow band of values (for both pressure and area). To get a more concrete
insight into the possible clustering of users’ profiles, we studied the variability seen by
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users for each of these two variables. Particularly, we computed the standard deviation
of the mean area and mean pressure exhibited by each of the users represented in
Figure 6.2a, and then plotted these values on a CDF (Figure 6.2b).
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sure and area across the population.
F ig u re 6.2: CDFs expressing the mean and variability of area and pressure across
the population.

Taking the case of pressure for instance, the figure shows th at about 40% of the
population had a standard deviation of over 0.15. Assuming users’ pressure values
follow a Gaussian distribution, a user with a standard deviation of 0.15 could see
her/his biometric pattern fall on a band having a width of up to

0 . 6

units (i.e.,

2

standard deviations on either side of the mean). Given such a wide span, an input
selected from the earlier mentioned clustered regions (Figure 6.2a) could have a good
chance of falling within such a user’s feature range.
Similar observations made for the other features (e.g., velocity, length of
strokes, start point of stroke, etc.)

further prompted us to believe th at generic

information from the population could possibly enable us to implement a lethal attack
on a touch-based authentication system.
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6.3.3 M echanical and Algorithm ic Design of R obot
Fabrication of the “Finger”: We had three main design considerations regard
ing the object to be used to touch the screen. These were: 1) the object had to be
able to register touch events on the capacitative screen,

2

) it had to easily match

the finger surface area as needed, 3) it had to be soft to avoid damaging the screen,
and 4) it had to be made from cheap, domestically accessible materials. The fourth
point rules out technologies such as prosthetics [72] th at despite guaranteeing artificial
fingers th at match many of the properties of a human finger, would make the attack
implementation expensive, and likely defeat our aim of demonstrating how easily the
attack can be launched based on materials th at are cheaply available off the shelf.
To address all four points we fabricated the finger surface from play-doh [73],
a malleable compound th at children use to model different kinds of play-objects.
Although play-doh on its own was (to our surprise) able to register touch points on
the screen, we housed it inside a touch screen glove (see [74]) in order to have more
close control of the “finger” area touching the screen. The small Play-doh lump was
fastened to the extreme end of a blunted steel nail to ensure firm contact between the
“finger” and the phone screen.
In all experiments we set our “finger” area to be approximately 0.15 units,
which was the mean value we observed across our user population. The area setting
itself was manual—we iteratively molded the play-doh and tested it on the phone
(during preliminary experiments) until the area value stabilized at around 0.15 units.
When the motors pushed the play-doh against the touch screen during scrolling, the
play-doh, owing to its softness, would see some amount of deformation. These small
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variations in play-doh touch surface area did not affect our attack th at much, since
human fingers also see variations in area along the path of a stroke.
Perhaps one interesting observation worth noting here is th a t when we con
nected a battery (AA type) to the play-doh during the attack, the area registered
on the phone screen increased. A possible reason for this is th a t the effective area of
contact between the screen and the phone is not only dependent on the physical area
of contact between the two, but, it also depends on the extent of electrical contact
between them. We leveraged this property to introduce changes in the “finger” area
during the experiments.
Robot Components and Attack Algorithm: The basic idea behind our attack
is for the finger to stroke the screen in such a way th at matches the average user’s
behavior. Based on population statistics therefore, the finger has to be set to: 1) move
at a certain average speed, 2 ) move in some general direction at a certain region of the
phone, and 3) exert a certain average pressure on the phone, to match the average
user. Compared to some of the tasks th at Lego robots have been programmed to
do in the literature (see [75] for an example), designing a Lego to attain the above
four targets is obviously a much more straightforward problem. We stress th at the
focus of our work is not to push at the boundaries of Lego design, but rather to
illustrate th a t a very cheap robot running a very simple algorithm (that could easily
be implemented by a novice attacker) is a much more rigorous penetration testing
tool for touch-based authentication systems than the current state-of-the-art methods.
While we take some steps to minimize the likelihood th a t the attack could be very
easily thwarted, the question of the most sophisticated robotic design th a t could be
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used for this kind of attack is not of interest in this work. In fact, depending on the
value of the resource to be retrieved from the phone, the attacker could potentially
use a more sophisticated robot (e.g., the NAO [76]) and hence a different design
philosophy. We leave all such investigations for future research after highlighting the
impact of a robotic attack based on the very bare minimum resources. Figure 6.3
depicts the robot design.

F ig u re 6.3: Mechanical design of the robot.

The main components used to build the robot are: 2 NXT Intelligent bricks,
3 motors, 4 gears, 4 wheels and the “finger” . One of the Intelligent bricks serves as
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the CPU of the system while the second one helps prevent the robot from toppling
over due to weight imbalances (also see Figure C .l, Appendix C). Motor C moves
the pen (or robot finger) on and off the phone screen while motors A and B move the
pen along the surface of the screen. The shape of the touch stroke is determined by
the movement of motors A and B which run concurrently. Motor A drives the robot
along a straight path while motor B, via a set of gears (see gear setup in Figure C.2,
Appendix C) drives the framework supporting the robot “finger” along a circular path
centered about the axis labeled R. To ensure th at the robot does not deviate from the
(approximately) straight path and get out of position (away from the phone region of
interest), we connected it to a beam whose movement was restricted between a pair
of rails firmly screwed on the board.
Based on observations on our dataset, most users’ strokes deviate very slightly
from a straight path. Because our attack seeks to mimic general user behavior (as
opposed to the traits of an individual user), our robot was designed to generate
near-straight strokes, with just a slight amount of curved behavior. Bar any effects
arising out of the mechanical interactions between robot components, our mechanical
and algorithmic design of the robot seeks to generate a straight stroke, with a very
slight amount of curvature at a section of the stroke. Figure 6.4 (see Figure 6.4b in
particular) illustrates the philosophy behind the curved section of our stroke. The
combination of a motor driving the pen along a curved trajectory (i.e., the arc labeled
AB) and a motor driving the pen along a straight line (i.e., path labeled CD) results
into the curved stroke section such as EF.
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(a) Design Philosophy #1: To generate a stroke, two motors run one after
the other (i.e., serially). One motor makes a horizontal displacement, the
other makes a vertical displacement. The x represents the points on the
physical path which are sampled by the Android system to represent a
stroke. The low sampling rate used by the Android OS (an average of 15
ms per sample in our experiments) guarantees that the system is blind
to the true shape of the stroke since a few points on each segment are
registered by the system.
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(b) Design Philosophy #2: To generate a stroke, two motors rim concur
rently. The final trajectory (e.g., EF) is a result of the superposition of
the two motor movements (e.g., AB and CD).
F ig u re 6.4: Philosophy behind the curved behavior of a touch stroke.
In our earlier design (see Figure 6.4a and (or) [77]), we used a different philos
ophy for the generation of a stroke. In th at design, the mechanical and algorithmic
implementation of the attack were such th a t the two motors controlling the shape of
the stroke run sequentially at right angles to each other to form the zig-zag (or close to
zig-zag) pattern th a t was our source of curvature. The coarse touch stroke sampling
rate (~ 15 ms on average) on our Google Nexus phones ensured th a t the Android
system was “blind” to the precise shape of the stroke. While the design was sufficient
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to illustrate the impact of the attack for our set of inputs, a generalized robotic
attack based on th a t design could (in theory and possibly in practice) be thwarted
in several ways. For example, an increment in the rate at which the Android system
samples touch points on the screen would potentially expose the zig-zag shape of
the stroke. Because humans don’t typically generate zig-zag strokes, detection of
the zig-zag pattern would be a key indicator for the possible occurrence of an attack.
Alternatively a sensor (such as an accelerometer or gyroscope) could be used to detect
repeated instances of a vibration pattern resulting from the zig-zag movement of the
robotic finger executing several strokes.
Depending on the exact attack setup, exploiting these theoretical weaknesses
in practice may not necessarily be be trivial, especially given th at we used a small
number of very short vertical and horizontal steps to create the saw-tooth shape.
We however still move to eliminate this theoretical weakness by using the design
represented by Figure 6.4b for this dissertation. Note though th at the final stroke
will not always be as smooth as trajectory EF due to the mechanical dynamics of the
robot components.
It is noteworthy th a t owing to mechanical factors {e.g., vibrations, friction,
variations in the shape and size of the play-doh, etc.), the strokes produced by either
approach can have notable variations from the behavior stipulated by the algorithm. W ith meticulous mechanical design of the robot however {e.g., through careful
selection of members, balancing weights, firmly securing vibrating elements, etc.),
this behavior can be minimized. We implemented the attack using the Lego NXT
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Mindstorms IDE [21] due to its straightforward support for motors with dissimilar
inputs running in parallel.
Figure 6.5 depicts a graphical model of how the motors generate a single stroke.
Motors B and C are connected in series with each other (i.e., they don’t run at the
same time), and their channel connected in parallel with th at of Motor A. At the
extreme ends of a stroke, the algorithm is such th at the “finger” (see Motor C) is not
in contact with the phone because the breaking (and in some cases starting) of the
robot is associated with momentum effects which may cause a distorted pattern on
the screen. The “finger” only moves towards the phone screen (see downward arrow
- Motor C) after Motor A (which carries the full weight of the robot and hence the
greatest momentum effects) has been in motion for sometime. At the end of a stroke,
the “finger” begins to leave the screen before Motor A comes to a stop.
tj
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F ig u re 6.5: Model for Generation of a Stroke.
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The exact duration for which the “finger” is in contact with the phone depends
on the initial position of the “finger” relative to the phone. This is in fact one of the
manual aspects of the attack, as we adjusted the position of the phone through trial
and error (e.g., by putting thin material under it) until the pressure th a t the “finger”
exerted on the screen during swiping reached our required average2. In practice the
attacker can use a phone (other than the one to be attacked) to guide these initial
settings.
At the end of each stroke, we allowed a pause of about Is in order for any
existing vibrations to die out before the next stroke was executed. After a number of
strokes, the robot may drift away from the region of interest since one end of the rails
was left open to allow for randomness in the exact length of a stroke. To address this,
we stopped the swiping, and then physically placed the robot back at the region of
interest. For each of the blocks represented in Figure 6.5, the motors are given power
and speed inputs (see Table 6.1).

Table 6.1: Parameter settings used for the robotic attack.
Motor Id
A
B1
b2
Ci
C2

Power
70

Time
0.7

1 2

0 .2

1 2

0 .1

25
70

0 .2
0 .2

The time parameters are in seconds while the power parameters are a function
of the voltage applied to the motor. These parameters are in essence just a general
2The Google Nexus S has a slight bulge at one end, so it does not sit perfectly horizontally if
rested on a flat surface. We tried to compensate for this imbalance by raising one side of the phone
more than the other.
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guide — a slight change in the experimental conditions could call for changes in
these inputs. B \ is the first block representing Motor B while B 2 is the second block
representing Motor B. The same notation is used for Motor C. The power input for
the upward motion of Motor C is greater than th a t for its downward motion because
the motor has to support the “finger” and its attached mechanism during the upward
movement. For the downward movement, the weight of the “finger” and its parts
assist the motor instead.
To generate a horizontal stroke, we positioned the phone such th a t the finger
started around the point with coordinates (363, 541) and moved towards the point
having the coordinates (145, 588)3. For the vertical strokes, the phone was positioned
such th a t the start coordinates were approximately (320,613) and the direction of the
finger being towards the point (352,400).

These values were the means/averages

observed over a portion of the full user population. Unlike in [77] where we explicitly
generated noise to cause variations in the different features across different strokes,
we rely on noise arising out of the mechanical interactions between robot elements as
our sole source of randomness. The fact th a t the whole robotic framework moves the
entire length of the stroke introduces a great amount of noise (e.g., due to vibrations
of the members). We find this noise to be sufficient to ensure th a t the robotic strokes
are not exactly similar to each other.
We set the power and time inputs of Motor C to the values tabulated so as
to get pressure outputs of between 0.4 and 0.6 on the phone screen. Depending on
factors such as the area of the finger and the initial position of the finger relative to
3In practice it only moves towards some point in the neighborhood of the point in question.
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the phone, one may have to set different values for these parameters in order to get
pressure outputs in this range. Like in the case of the finger area (see Section 6.3.3.),
we not only iteratively set the pressure during initial experiments, but also depended
on a connected battery to increase the pressure to the required range. To ease the
task of setting the various attack parameters, we enabled pointer locations (under
developer options) so as to view the strokes and their associated raw feature outputs
on the screen during the fine-tuning phase.

6.4 Attack Performance Evaluation
6.4.1 Verification Algorithm s
We demonstrate the impact of the attack using a Support Vector Machine
(SVM) [78] and the k-Nearest Neighbors (k-NN) classifier [79]. We select these two
verification algorithms because they have recently been shown in [1 1 ] and [1 0 ] to
perform very well for continuous touch-based authentication. We briefly describe the
mechanisms of operation of the two algorithms below:
Support Vector Machine: An SVM is a binary classifier which uses a hyper
plane to separate two data classes in such a way th at the margin between the two
classes is maximized. The margin is the distance between the hyperplane and the
boundary observations which are also referred to as support vectors.

For classes

th at are not linearly separable in a given feature space, it is sometimes necessary to
map the original d ata points to a higher dimensional space with the aid of a kernel
function. We used the Gaussian radial-basis function as our kernel, like was done in
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[10]. During classification, we set a given user’s data as the positive class, and a set
of samples randomly selected from the other users as the negative class.
k-Nearest Neighbors: During training, this classifier does not have to extract
any model from the data—it only stores the feature vectors from the different classes
(in our case two classes). Given a new observation th at is to be assigned a class
label, the k-NN classifier assigns it to the class A if the majority of the k closest
training vectors to the new observation belong to the class A. Different researchers
use different measures to represent the distance between the training vectors and a
test observation. In this work we use the Eucledian distance metric since it was also
used in [10]. Like we did for the SVM, during training, we set a given user’s data
as the positive class (genuine class), and a set of randomly selected samples from the
rest of the population as the negative class (impostor class).
For both the k-NN and SVM, we used WEKA [67] via its Java API to
implement the classification system. We used k= 9 for the k-NN classifier since this
value gave us the best performance. For all other parameters across the two classifiers,
we used the WEKA defaults.

6.4.2 Training and Testing M ethodology
Training and Zero-effort Testing: Training was done based on data collected
during Session I while zero-effort testing was done based on data collected during
Session II. For each user, we distinguished between portrait and landscape strokes,
and further distinguished between horizontal and vertical strokes for each of the two
phone orientations. This way, each user had four reference templates. The reason for
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separating between these four types of strokes was because certain features change
depending on the type of stroke and the way in which the phone is held when the stroke
is executed. For example, for the typical user, a horizontal stroke executed in portrait
mode will very likely have different start and end-points (among other features) from
a horizontal stroke executed in landscape mode. Owing to the mismatch between
features, a classification mechanism th at does not distinguish between these two types
of strokes will likely perform unreliably.
In practice we believe th at a touch-based authentication application should
use all four types of reference templates since users can switch between stroke types
depending on the type and organization of content they read on the phone. Regardless
of whether a user is biased towards a certain type of stroke, the system should be
able to accurately perform classification during those times when the user executes
the other kinds of strokes.
For each of the four categories of strokes, we only performed our analysis for
those users who executed at least 80 strokes during Session I. For the portrait strokes
we had 106 and 118 users who met this 80 strokes requirement for the horizontal and
vertical strokes respectively. For the landscape strokes, we had 41 and 50 users who
met the requirement for the horizontal and vertical strokes respectively. For training,
we used 80 strokes executed by the user in question (i.e., genuine or positive class)
and 5 strokes from each of the other users (i.e., the impostor or negative class) for
each of the four categories of strokes.
To establish a baseline against which to measure the impact of the robotic
attack, we carried out zero-effort testing for each user. In these tests, to launch an
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impostor attack against a given user’s template, we used

1 0

strokes from each, of the

other users. To carry out a genuine attack against a given user’s template, we used
all the strokes captured from th at particular user during Session II. Because a user
will every now and then execute a stroke which is very distinct from the rest of her
strokes, we used a block of strokes, rather than a single stroke to make authentication
decisions.
Each legitimate or impostor authentication attem pt was based on a single vec
tor derived from 10 consecutive feature vectors (or strokes). The single authentication
vector was computed such th a t its elements were the component-wise means of the
10 vectors contained in a sliding window. From the results obtained from these tests,
we generated four Detection Error Tradeoff (DET) curves [80] for each user, one for
each kind of swiping. From each of these curves, we determined the Equal Error Rate.
Robotic Testing The robotic testing process was the same as th at described in Section
6.4.2, except th at the impostor attack was based on samples generated by the robot.
We will refer to the impostor attack in this case as the robotic impostor attack. We
used 600 strokes generated by the robot to carry out this attack against each user.
Like we did in the zero-effort tests, we again generated two DET curves for each user,
and calculated the EER from each of the curves.

6.4.3 Attack Results
The Failure to Enroll Policy: To rigorously evaluate the impact of the attack,
we employed a “failure to enroll’ policy in which we only enrolled users whose mean
EERs across the two verifiers at baseline were less than a certain EER threshold
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(a )4. Our attack performance evaluation was done at values of a ranging from

0 . 2

to 0.08. We chose an upper bound of a= 0.2 because we believe th a t a user with an
EER higher than th at would probably not use the technology anyway. For the lower
bound we decided to use a=0.08 because the number of users able to enroll on the
system became too small for values of a less than that.
Mean Impact of the Attack: Figures

6 . 6

and 6.7 respectively summarize the

effect of the attack on the mean and standard deviation of the classifier EERs.
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F ig u re 6 . 6 : Impact of the robotic attack on the classification of the horizontal strokes
generated in portrait mode.
4For each user we computed the EER seen with each of the k-NN and SVM verifiers at baseline
and found the mean of these two values. It is this mean value that we compared with a in order to
make “failure to enroll’ decisions.
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F ig u re 6.7: Impact of the robotic attack on the classification of the vertical strokes
generated in portrait mode.
For different values of a , we computed the mean EER and standard deviation
of the EERs across the population before and after the robotic impostor attack.
Figures 6 . 6 and 6.7 respectively summarize these results for the horizontal and vertical
touch strokes. The bottom (horizontal) axis shows the different EER thresholds (a),
while the top (horizontal) axis shows the number of users who were able to enroll onto
the system at each value of a. Before the robotic attack was launched we obtained
EERs of between 0.13 and 0.035 (see plots on the left side of Figures

6 . 6

and 6.7).

These EERs are higher than the EERs reported in [10], but comparable to those
reported in [1 2 ] during the sub-set of experiments in which the users did not wear
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a digital sensor glove. W ith our baseline EERs 5 (i.e., EERs before attack) being
comparable to the EERs reported in the literature, we proceeded to evaluate the
impact of the robotic attack.
Observe (Figures 6 .6 b, 6 .6 d, 6.7b, 6.7d) th a t for both the vertical and horizon
tal strokes, the attack drastically increased both the mean EERs and the standard
deviation of the EERs. The high mean EERs indicate th at users begin to see very high
False Reject Rates (FRRs), while impostors see equally high False Acceptance Rates
(FARs). Also, the high variance in EERs implies th a t system performance becomes
very unreliable/unpredictable as a result of the attack. It is noteworthy th at the
heightened EERs and standard deviations persist for both verification algorithms even
when the system is used only by the best performing users (i.e., a=0.08). This implies
th a t a defence mechanism centered around barring the poor users from enrolling onto
the system would not thw art the attack. Table 6.2 gives a more precise view of the
impact of the attack on the mean EERs.
T a b le 6.2: Percentage increment in mean EER due to the robotic impostor attack
on the portrait strokes.
a
0 . 2

0.18
0.16
0.14
0 . 1 2
0 .1

0.08

SVM
Horizontal Vertical
377.3%
407.6%
479.8%
486.9%
522.2%
695.4%
799.5%

638.6%
734.9%
752.9%
702.8%
1021.7%
1175.8%
1535.6%

k -N N
Horizontal Vertical
333.8%
375.7%
401.2%
436.2%
509.7%
691.9%
803.3%

382.9%
405.6%
475.4%
583.1%
779.4%
827.0%
863.2%

5See our work in [81] for an in-depth analysis of the baseline EERs of various algorithms.
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The table shows the percentage change in mean system EER seen by each
verification algorithm as a result of the attack. Regardless of the verification algorithm
or failure to enroll threshold, the percentage change in mean EER is beyond 300% in
all cases, and over 1500% in the most extreme case.

These results confirm why

the robotic attack would significantly degrade the performance of a touch-based
authentication system.
Impact of the Attack on each User: Figure

6 . 8

summarizes the impact of the

attack on each user’s verification performance.
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. 8 : Impact of the attack on each user’s portrait strokes.
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For each user, we subtracted the EER seen under the zero-effort attack from
th at seen under the robotic attack and then plotted the CDFs of these changes in
EER for each of the two extreme failure-to-enroll thresholds. For this analysis we
only present results for a=0.2 and a=0.08 since the other values of a did not give us
any new insights. The plot reveals two salient features:
1. There was a proportion of users (in some cases up to 30% of the population)
whose EER changes were negative. For these kinds of users, the robotic attack
actually performed worse (i.e., caused lower EERs) than the zero-effort attack.
Since our attack was designed based on data gleaned from the population, this
trend suggests th at there is a proportion of users (say, 30% of the population)
whose touch gesture biometric footprint is very distinct from th at of the m ajority
of the users.
2. There was a proportion of users who had EER changes th at were extremely
high (close to 1). These types of users likely had their touch biometric patterns
very similar to the mean values observed over the population.
These two features to some extent explain the high variance seen in Figures
6

.6 b, 6 .6 d, 6.7b and 6.7d, since a combination of users seeing decrements in EER and

others seeing very drastic increments in EER must have resulted into a population
having very high variability in EER relative to the variability seen before the robotic
attack. Results obtained with the phone held in landscape mode are left out because
they did not provide any noteworthy new insights.

CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this Dissertation we conducted a rigorous pattern analysis on keystroke
and touch biometrics d ata and leveraged the observed traits to design a new family
of attacks th at break keystroke and touch authentication systems. We evaluated the
impact of our algorithmic attack on the best verification algorithms in the keystroke
and touch authentication fields and compared the performance to th a t seen with the
traditional zero-effort attacks.
W hen subjected to zero-effort impostor attacks, the EERs of the keystroke
verification algorithms were between

0 . 2

and 0.08 for a set of password strings whose

lengths ranged between 7 and 20 characters. This range of EERs was comparable
to the zero-effort EERs reported in the benchmark study in [6 ]. W hen we launched
our algorithmic attack, the EERs of the three verifiers increased by between 28.6%
and 84.4%, relative to the zero-effort EERs. Also, we found th a t the shorter pass
words were more vulnerable to the attacks, and th a t a small proportion of the
user-population accounted for most of the performance degradation caused by the
algorithmic attack.
For the touch-based authentication system, the mean EERs of the verification
algorithms were between 0.08 and 0.035 under the zero-effort attack. This range of
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EERs was comparable to the EERs reported in the literature [12]. When we launched
our robotic attack, the mean EERs of the verification algorithms increased by between
333.8% and 1535.6% depending on the failure-to-enroll threshold and type of touch
stroke subjected to attack. Like was observed with the keystroke attacks, a subset of
the population resisted the attack, while another subset of users badly succumbed to
the attack.
In general, the results from our research indicate th at in comparison to the
zero-effort attacks typically used to test keystroke and touch authentication systems,
our algorithmic attacks were considerably much more lethal. The kinds of synthetic
attacks presented in this work rest on two premises: 1) The large amounts of keystroke
and touch biometrics d ata required to design the attack can be easily accessed by
committed adversaries, and, 2) The software tools and cheap easily programmable
robots required to implement the attacks are within the reach of adversaries. From
evidence cited in this work, these are realistic assumptions, implying th at a keystroke
or touch-based authentication system would have a decent chance of being subjected
to such a kind of attack in practice.
There are several aspects of our attacks th at might need further research.
First, like most past studies in this area (see works cited in Chapter

2

), our touch

biometrics data collection was based on a group of users who used a small number
of specialized applications (two applications in our case). In practice, people use a
wide range of applications, some of which are designed for tasks which could prompt
“touch signatures” (e.g., with regard to regions of the phone th a t people touch) th at
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are very different from those seen with our applications. It would be interesting to
determine how the attack scales to a large number of applications.
Another area worthy of investigation is whether a touch stroke could be
decomposed into a set of features th at are more resilient to this kind of attack
than our features. Because touch-based authentication does not yet have a standard
set of features universally used by all researchers, we defined a set of 28 features
th at captured the key statistical attributes exhibited along a stroke. The underlying
philosophy behind our feature definitions is not so different from th a t of the features
used in past work, however, this does not guarantee th at all feature-sets will succumb
to the attack in exactly the same way.

It is thus interesting to determine how

much less or how much more the other features are affected by the attack. Similar
kinds of questions can be raised about our keystroke attacks — e.g., with regard to
the variety of keyboards used during data collection, the variety of texts analyzed
and the question of how the findings relate to free-text keystroke authentication.
Investigations into the effects of changes in these variables would greatly increase
the community’s understanding of the extent of the threat posed by these types of
attacks.
The above open research problems notwithstanding, our attacks highlight pre
viously unknown threats to keystroke and touch-based authentication. Our findings
do not only call for more stringent performance evaluation of keystroke and touchbased authentication systems, but should also motivate research into technologies
which could defend against the larger family of robotic and software attacks, two
instances of which have been demonstrated in this dissertation.

APPENDIX A
CHECKING FOR THE SKEWNESS REQUIREMENT OF
THE WILCOXON SIGNED-RANK TEST
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F ig u re A .l: Skewness of A D f vectors.
In Figure A. la, the A D f vectors are computed such th at the features f i and
/2

forming a pair are both KHTs. For each feature-pair, the associated A D f vector is

computed based on a set of 3000 randomly selected user-pairs. Since our test-phrase
contains 58 KHTs, there are (528) = 1653 possible feature-pairs th a t can be formed
out of the set of KHTs. We compute a A D / vector for each of these feature-pairs,
and calculate the skewness value of this A D f vector. Figure A. l a is a CDF of the
full array of skewness values obtained across all 1653 KHT feature-pairs. W ith both
f i and

/2

being KITs, we repeat the procedure to generate the CDF in Figure A. lb.

Results on the two plots generally supported the use of the Wilcoxon signed-rank test,
as all KHT feature-pairs had a A D f vector with skewness between -0.3 and 0.3, and
about 95% of KIT feature-pairs had a A D f vector with skewness between -0.5 and
0.5.

APPENDIX B
INTRA-USER VARIATIONS FOR SELECTED KHTS
AND KITS
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F ig u re B .l: Intra-user variability of KHTs and KITs.
For each of the
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features used to plot the two graphs, we calculate the

standard deviation exhibited by each user in our population and then generate a
CDF of the standard deviations. In the context of a statistical attack, high intra
user variability for a given feature indicates th at the user’s profile for the feature
in question could be matched by a wide range of guesses. For clarity of the plots,
standard deviations exceeding 40 ms and 100 ms for the KHTs (Figure B .la) and KITs
(Figures B .lb) respectively, were filtered off before generating the CDFs, since a very
small proportion of users had standard deviations exceeding these thresholds. The

8

selected features show the general trend observed across the dataset. Observe th at
different features did not necessarily have similarly shaped distributions, an indication
of why the adversary would benefit from a feature-by-feature understanding of the
statistical traits exhibited by keystroke data associated with the password in question.

APPENDIX C
LEGO CONSTRUCTION

92

93
The NXT brick at the far end right provides a balancing moment th a t prevents
the robot from toppling over due to the combined weight of the motor and fingersupport mechanism on the other side of the robot.

F ig u re C .l: Aerial view of the robot.
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The gear-pairs are selected in such a way to produce a low speed and high
torque to drive the “finger” and its support-mechanism.

F ig u re C .2: Gear mechanism driving the robot “finger” along a circular arc.

APPENDIX D
HUM AN USE IRB APPROVAL DOCUMENTS

95

96

D.l HUC 1086

LOUISIANA TECH
U N I V E R S I T Y
MEMORANDUM
OFFICE OF U N IV ER SITY RESEARCH

TO:

Mr. Abdul Serwadda and Dr. Phoha

FROM:

Barbara Talbot, University Research

SUBJECT:

HUMAN USE COMMITTEE REVIEW

DATE:

April 11,2013

In order to facilitate your project, an EXPEDITED REVIEW has been done for your proposed
study entitled:

“Characterizing Mobile Phone Users Based on Typing Patterns
Touch Gestures and Body Movement”
HUC 1086
The proposed study’s revised procedures were found to provide reasonable and adequate
safeguards against possible risks involving human subjects. The information to be collected may
be personal in nature or implication. Therefore, diligent care needs to be taken to protect the
privacy o f the participants and to assure that the data are kept confidential. Informed consent is a
critical part o f the research process. The subjects must be informed that their participation is
voluntary. It is important that consent materials be presented in a language understandable to
every participant. If you have participants in your study whose first language is not English, be
sure that informed consent materials are adequately explained or translated. Since your reviewed
project appears to do no damage to the participants, the Human Use Committee grants approval
o f the involvement o f human subjects as outlined.
Projects should be renewed annually. This approval was finalized on April 11, 2013 and this
project will need to receive a continuation review by the IRB if the project, including data
analysis, continues beyond April 11, 2014. Any discrepancies in procedure or changes that have
been made including approved changes should be noted in the review application. Projects
involving NIH funds require annual education training to be documented. For more information
regarding this, contact the Office o f University Research.
You are requested to maintain written records o f your procedures, data collected, and subjects
involved. These records will need to be available upon request during the conduct o f the study
and retained by the university for three years after the conclusion o f the study. If changes occur
in recruiting o f subjects, informed consent process or in your research protocol, or if
unanticipated problems should arise it is the Researchers responsibility to notify the Office o f
Research or IRB in writing. The project should be discontinued until modifications can be
reviewed and approved.
If you have any questions, please contact Dr. Mary Livingston at 257-2292 or 257-5066.
A M EM BER O f THE UNIVERSITY OF L O U ISIA N A SYSTEM

P.O . BOX 3092 • RU STO N . LA 71272 • TELEPH O N E (318) 257-5075 • FAX (318) 257-5079
AN

E Q U A L O P P O R T U N IT Y U N IV E R SIT Y

97
D.2 HUC 416

*

LO U ISIA N A TECH
U N I V E R S I T Y
O FFIC E O F U N IV E R SIT Y R E SE A R C H

M EM ORANDUM

TO:

Dr. V ir Phoha

FROM :

Dr. L es G u ice, V .P . for R esearch & D ev elo p m en t

S U B JE C T :

H um an U se C om m ittee R ev ie w

DATE:

N o v em b e r 1 9 ,2 0 1 2

RE:

TITLE:

A p p roved C ontinuation o f Study H U C 4 1 6 w ith
A ttached A m endm ents
“ S tu d ie s R e la te d to th e u se o f
K e y s tr o k e D y n a m ic s a s a B io m e tr ic ”
H U C - 4 1 6 A d d in g A m end m en t D ated O ctob er 3 0 , 2 0 1 2

T h e ab o v e referenced stud y has b een approved as o f N o v e m b e r 19, 2 0 1 2 as a
con tinu ation o f the original study that receiv ed approval on S ep tem b er 7, 2 0 0 8 . T h is
p r o je c t w ill n e e d to r e c e iv e a c o n tin u a tio n re v ie w b y th e IR B i f th e p r o je c t,
in c lu d in g c o lle c tin g o r a n a ly z in g d a ta , c o n tin u e s b e y o n d N o v e m b e r 1 9 , 2 0 1 3 . A n y
d iscrep an cies in p rocedure or ch an ges that h ave b een m ade in clu d in g ap proved ch a n g es
sh ou ld b e n oted in the rev iew application. Projects in v o lv in g N IH fun ds require annual
ed u cation training to b e docu m ented . For m ore inform ation regarding th is, con tact the
O ffic e o f U n iv ersity R esearch.
Y ou are requ ested to m aintain w ritten records o f your p rocedu res, data co lle c te d , and
su bjects in v o lv ed . T h ese records w ill n eed to b e a v a ila b le u pon requ est during the
con d uct o f the stu d y and retained b y the u n iversity for three years after the co n clu sio n
o f the study. I f ch a n g es occur in recruiting o f su bjects, in form ed c o n se n t p ro cess or in
your research p rotocol, or i f unanticipated p rob lem s sh o u ld arise it is the R esearchers
r esp o n sib ility to n o tify the O ffic e o f R esearch or IR B in w riting. T h e project sh o u ld be
d iscon tin u ed u ntil m o d ifica tio n s can be rev iew ed and approved.
I f y o u h ave an y q u estio n s, p lea se contact Dr. M ary L iv in g sto n at 2 5 7 -4 3 1 5 .

A M E M B E R O F T H E U N IV ER SITY O F L O U IS IA N A SY ST E M

P.O . BOX 3092 • R U S T O N , I A 71272 • T E L E P H O N E (3181 257-5075 * FAX (318) 257-5079
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MEMORANDUM

TO:

Dr. Vir Phoha

FROM:

Barbara Talbot, University Research

SUBJECT:

Human Use Committee Review

DATE:

March 1,2010

RE:

Approved Continuation of Study HUC 416
Changing Number of Subjects from 500 to 2000

TITLE:

“Studies Related to the use of Keystroke Dynamics as a Biometric”
# HUC-416

The above referenced study has been approved as of March 1,2011 as a continuation of
the original study that received approval on September 7, 2008. This project will need
to receive a continuation review by the IRB if the project, including collecting or
analyzing data, continues beyond March 1,2012. Any discrepancies in procedure or
changes that have been made including approved changes should be noted in the review
application. Projects involving NIH funds require annual education training to be
documented. For more information regarding this, contact the Office of University
Research.
You are requested to maintain written records of your procedures, data collected, and
subjects involved. These records will need to be available upon request during the
conduct of the study and retained by the university for three years after the conclusion
of the study. If changes occur in recruiting of subjects, informed consent process or in
your research protocol, or if unanticipated problems should arise it is the Researchers
responsibility to notify the Office of Research or IRB in writing. The project should be
discontinued until modifications can be reviewed and approved.
If you have any questions, please contact Dr. Mary Livingston at 257-4315.

A MEMBER OF THE UNIVERSITY OF LOUISIANA SYSTEM
P .O . BO X 3092 • R U STO N 7, LA 71272 • T E L E P H O N E (318) 257-5075 • FAX (318) 257-5079
AN EQUAL O PPORTUNITY UNIVERSITY
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MEMORANDUM

TO:

Dr. Vir Phoha

FROM:

Barbara Talbot, University Research

SUBJECT:

Human Use Committee Review

DATE:

September 28,2009

RE:

Approved Continuation of Study HUC 416

TITLE:

“Studies Related to the use of Keystroke Dynamics as a Biometric”
# HUC-416

The above referenced study has been approved as of September 16, 2009 as a
continuation of the original study that received approval on September 7, 2008. This
project will need to receive a continuation review by the IRB if the project,
including collecting or analyzing data, continues beyond September 16,2010. Any
discrepancies in procedure or changes that have been made including approved changes
should be noted in the review application. Projects involving NIH funds require annual
education training to be documented. For more information regarding this, contact the
Office of University Research.
You are requested to maintain written records of your procedures, data collected, and
subjects involved. These records will need to be available upon request during the
conduct of the study and retained by die university for three years after the conclusion
of the study. If changes occur in recruiting of subjects, informed consent process or in
your research protocol, or if unanticipated problems should arise it is the Researchers
responsibility to notify die Office of Research or IRB in writing. The project should be
discontinued until modifications can be reviewed and approved.
If you have any questions, please contact Dr. Mary Livingston at 257-4315.

A MEMBER OF THE UNIVERSITY OF LOUISIANA SYSTEM

P.O. BOX 3092 • RUSTON, LA 71272 • TELEPHONE 018) 257-5075 • FAX 018) 257-5079
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MEMORANDUM

TO:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
DATE:

Dr. Vir Phoha
Barbara Talbot, University Research
HUMAN USE COMMITTEE REVIEW
September 16,2008

In order to facilitate your project, an EXPEDITED REVIEW has been done for your proposed study
entitled:

“Studies Related to the use of Keystroke Dynamics as a Biometric”
# HUC-416
The proposed study's revised procedures were found to provide reasonable m d adequate safeguards
against possible rides involving human subjects. The information to be collected may be personal in
nature or implication. Therefore, diligent care needs to be taken to protect the privacy o f the participants
and to assure that the data are kept confidential. Informed consent is a critical part o f the research
process. The subjects must be informed that their participation is voluntary. It is important that consent
materials be presented in a language understandable to every participant. If you have participants in your
study w hose first language is not English, be sure that informed consent materials are adequately
explained or translated. Since your reviewed project appears to do no damage to die participants, the
Human U se Committee grants approval o f the involvement o f human subjects as outlined.
Projects should be renewed annually. This approval was finalized on September 4,2008 and this project

wiU need to receive a continuation review by the IRB if the project, Including data analysis, continues
beyond September 4, 2009. Any discrepancies in procedure or changes that have been made including
approved changes should be noted in the review application. Projects involving NIH funds require annual
education training to be documented. For more information regarding this, contact tbe O ffice o f
University Research.
You are requested to maintain written records o f your procedures, data collected, and subjects involved.
These records w ill need to be available upon request during the conduct o f die study and retained by the
university for three years after the conclusion o f the study. If changes occur in recruiting o f subjects,
informed consent process or in your research protocol, or i f unanticipated problems should arise it is the
Researchers responsibility to notify the Office o f Research or IRB in writing. The project should be
discontinued until modifications can be reviewed and approved.
If you have any questions, please contact Dr. Mary Livingston at 257-4315.
A MEMBER OF THE UNIVERSITY OF LOUISIANA SYSTEM
P.O . B O X 3092 •R U S T O N , LA 71272 • TELEPH O N E I31W 257-5075 • FAX (3181 257-5079
AN EQUAL OPPO RTU NITY UNIVERSITY
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MEMORANDUM

TO:

Dr. Vir Phoha

FROM:

Barbara Talbot, University Research

SUBJECT:

HUMAN USE COMMITTEE REVIEW

DATE:

September 17,2007

In order to facilitate your project, an EXPEDITED REVIEW has been done for your proposed
study entitled:
“Studies Related to the use of Keystroke
Dynamics as a Biometric
# HUC-416
The proposed study's revised procedures were found to provide reasonable and adequate safeguards
against possible risks involving human subjects. The information to be collected may be personal in
nature or implication. Therefore, diligent care needs to be taken to protect the privacy o f the participants
and to assure that the data are kept confidential. Informed consent is a critical part o f the research
process. The subjects must be informed that their participation is voluntary. It is important that consent
materials be presented in a language understandable to every participant. If you have participants in your
study w hose first language is not English, be sure that informed consent materials are adequately
explained or translated. Since your reviewed project appears to do no damage to the participants, the
Human U se Committee grants approval o f the involvement o f human subjects as outlined.
Projects should be renewed annually. This approval wasfinalized on September 7,2667 and this project
will need to receive a continuation review by the IRB if the project, including data analysis, continues
beyond September 7, 2668. Any discrepancies in procedure or changes that have been made including
approved changes should be noted in the review application. Projects involving NIH funds require annual
education training to be documented. For more information regarding this, contact the O ffice o f
University Research.
You are requested to maintain written records o f your procedures, data collected, and subjects involved.
These records will need to be available upon request during the conduct o f the study and retained by the
university for three years after the conclusion o f the study. If changes occur in recruiting o f subjects,
informed consent process or in your research protocol, or i f unanticipated problems should arise it is the
Researchers responsibility to notify the O ffice o f Research or IRB in writing. The project should be
discontinued until modifications can be reviewed and approved.
If you have any questions, please contact Dr. Mary Livingston at 2 574315.
A MEMBER OF THE UNIVERSITY OF LOUISIANA SYSTEM
P.O . B O X 3092 •R U S T O N , LA 71272 • TE L E PH O N E (318) 2S7-5075 • FAX 0 1 8 ) 257-3079
AK EQUAL O fPO rrU N IT Y UNIVERSITY
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